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Аннотация: 
Дискуссия о направлении внешней политики Турции набрала силу в соответствии с 
укреплением ПСР во внутренних партиях в качестве центральной правящей партии. На 
данный момент большая часть литературы посвящена идеологическим особенностям 
ПСР, особенно в отношении ислама. Стремясь к расширению за пределами этого 
взгляда, этот тезис направлен на то, чтобы выделить ряд точек торможения между 
Турцией и Западом, которые анализируются как основные движущие силы 
переориентации во внешней политике Турции. Ориентация Турции на Запад 
основывалась на восприятии внешней угрозы, порожденном озабоченностью 
воспринимаемой советской угрозы. Говоря о сегодняшнем дне, проблемы 
безопасности остаются в качестве основного вопроса в направлении внешней политики 
Турции, поэтому новое позиционирование Турции нацелено на удовлетворение 
существующих проблем безопасности с гибким прогнозом на будущее. 
 
Ключевые слова: Внешняя политика Турции, Внешние Угрозы, Теория баланса угроз, 
Геополитическое Мышление, Формирование Альянсов 
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Abstract: 
Debate on the direction of Turkish foreign policy has gained momentum in line with the 
strengthening of the AKP in domestic parties as a central ruling party. At this point, most 
literature has focused on the AKP’s ideological features, particularly with regards to Islam. In 
an attempt to expand outside of this view, this thesis aims to highlight a series of sticking 
points between Turkey and the West, which are analysed as the main drivers of the 
reorientation in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s orientation to the West was based on an 
external threat perception, born out of the concern of a perceived Soviet threat. Speaking of 
the present day, security concerns remain as the primary issue on Turkish foreign policy’s 
direction, therefore Turkey’s new positioning aims at meeting existing security concerns with 
a flexible outlook to the future. 
Key Words: Turkish Foreign Policy, External Threats, the Balance of Threat Theory, 
Geopolitical Thinking, Alliance Formation 
  
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
АННОТАЦИЯ: .................................................................................................................. 1 
ABSTRACT: ....................................................................................................................... 3 
INTRODUCTION: ............................................................................................................. 6 
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...................... 16 
1.1: NEOREALIST THEORY .............................................................................................. 16 
1.2: DEFINING STRATEGIC ORIENTATION ....................................................................... 18 
1.3: ALLIANCE FORMATION TO BALANCE EXTERNAL THREATS .................................... 20 
1.4: PREDICTING OTHERS’ FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................. 23 
1.5: SOURCES OF GEOPOLITICAL THINKING ................................................................... 24 
CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION OF TURKEY’S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION 
PROBLEM ........................................................................................................................ 26 
2.1 ATATURK ERA ........................................................................................................... 26 
2.2 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING SECOND WORLD WAR ...................................... 29 
2.3 NATO MEMBERSHIP PROCESS (1947-1952)............................................................... 31 
2.4 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION DURING COLD WAR: .............................. 34 
2.4.1 Western-Oriented Years (1952-1974) ................................................................. 34 
2.4.2 Relative Autonomy (1974-1978) ......................................................................... 37 
2.4.3 Reconciliation (1978-1983) ................................................................................ 41 
2.4.4 Back to Western-Oriented Foreign Policy: (1983-1989) .................................... 42 
2.5 POST-COLD WAR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: ......................................................... 43 
2.5.1 New World Order................................................................................................ 43 
2.5.2 Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy .............................................................. 44 
2.5.3 AKP era: Western-Oriented Years (2002-2011) .................................................. 46 
2.5.4 AKP’s Partial Face Off with Geopolitical Facts ................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 3: THE CRISIS OF PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION ............................. 53 
3.1 PERENNIAL THREATS ................................................................................................ 53 
3.1.1 Cyprus Issue ....................................................................................................... 53 
3.1.2  Kurdish issue ..................................................................................................... 61 
3.1.3 Aegean Dispute ................................................................................................... 69 
3.1.4 Gulen Organisation ............................................................................................ 72 
5 
 
3.2 INSIGHT FOR BALANCING STRATEGIES ..................................................................... 77 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 80 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 85 
1-PRIMARY SOURCES: .............................................................................................. 85 
2-SECONDARY SOURCES ......................................................................................... 88 
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................ 96 
  
6 
 
Introduction: 
Research Problem: 
Debates on Turkey’s foreign policy direction have accelerated especially as of the second 
electoral victory of AKP. Many scholars have taken AKP’s Islamic identity as the driver of 
Turkey’s reorientation in international relations. Therefore, most literature has stood on 
identity-based explanations while reasoning observed reorientation fact, other aspects such as 
national interests and security have been overlooked in most literature, these aspects of the 
issue, therefore, are needed to study comprehensively. Moreover, the existent literature falls 
short of explaining different directional shifts made under the rule of the same government as 
they mostly focus on the ideological basis of governments. For instance, they do not answer 
the following questions: while AKP and Gulen were previously referred to as the closest 
allies, then what made them turn against each other? Or while AKP pursued very soft policies 
against Kurdish groups until recent years, why has it radically revised its policy? The lack of 
existent literature to address these questions is based on their excessive focusing to identity-
based issues.  
Furthermore, most literature analysing the visible discrepancies between Turkey and West 
concentrate on the retrogressing parliamentarian-democracy of Turkey with laying emphasis 
on alleged authoritarianism tendency of the political leadership of Turkey. As a result, they 
put domestic political issues at the forefront to explain Turkey’s deviation from the West. On 
the other hand, their consideration towards the West is also based on identity-based 
understandings. The analyses concerning the West in most literature are just like general 
perceptions of Turkey as it is defined mostly by its liberal-democratic identity. However, 
both Turkey and the West are also geopolitical bodies pursuing various geopolitical interests 
in international relations. It is very common in literature isolating two political actors from 
their geopolitical interests and defining them only with identity-based explanations. 
However, regardless of their ideological features, there are geopolitical sticking points 
between the West and Turkey which have not been studied comprehensively. Identity-based 
differences on perceptions between the West and Turkey are mostly arisen from 
differentiating interests of two actors. For instance, while PKK-linked groups are considered 
terrorist organisations in Turkey, they are mostly regarded guerrilla groups or freedom 
fighters in the eyes of the West since the end of the Cold War but same groups were 
considered terrorist organisations in the conditions of the Cold War when they were 
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sponsored by the USSR and Syria. Therefore, geopolitical attitudes play a significant role 
also determining others’ identity. In this thesis, I will analyse geopolitical factors such as 
security or strategic interests pushing Turkey to separate its foreign policy direction from the 
West. 
Research Question and Objective: 
My aim in this thesis is to address the following question “what are the strategic drivers of 
Turkish orientation moving Turkey away from the West?” In other words, this paper aims to 
explore strategic factors that set off the Turkey’s reorientation efforts. To achieve this aim, I 
will analyse strategic sticking points between the West and Turkey, stimulating Turkey to 
reorient its foreign policy direction. This study is significant to comprehend underlying 
reasons of Turkey’s deviation from the West. Moreover, since geopolitical and strategic 
interests of a state do not easily change depending on domestic politics, this thesis provides 
also insight about the future direction of Turkish foreign policy by analysing Turkey’s 
strategic orientation while laying emphasis on these long-term strategic interests of Turkey.  
In contrast to identity-based theories, that are prone to isolate international actors from their 
geopolitical interests, neorealist theory in a sense of its general understanding concerning 
international relations is essential for this work as interactions of international actors are 
taken based on geopolitical interests. The state of alignment and state of conflict mapped in 
neorealist theory are overlapping with understandings of strategic orientation concepts in 
general terms. Nevertheless, as an intra-neorealist discipline debate between the balance of 
threat and balance of power theories, we take the balance of threat theory since it is more 
capable of explaining Turkey’s orientation problem. Differently from the balance of power 
theory, that argues states form alliances to balance hegemon states, the balance of threat 
theory argues that states form alliances to balance external threats. Speaking of Turkey’s 
orientation process, this work argues that external threats that are not poised by Turkey’s 
national capacities would only be balanced by correct alliance formation. 
Speaking of correct alliance formation, determining external threats correctly has a vital 
importance since the primary objective of joining with others is to balance external threats. In 
this thesis, I will divide ways of the mentality of decision-makers into two groups in terms of 
method of external threat choosing: ideological and geopolitical thinking. While the former is 
holding identity-based concerns, the latter is based on strategic interests of a state such as 
8 
 
surveillance. Therefore, this distinction is also significant for this work in order to analyse 
which way of thinking is more intense in Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. 
This thesis takes geopolitical thinking as an important component of Turkish strategic 
orientation process since correct detection of threats is the only way that can enable Turkey to 
carry out its strategic orientation for the purpose of balancing external threats. 
Literature Review: 
Strategic orientation concept is based on the four main principles: its neorealist understanding 
of international relations, the classification of foreign policy change, the purpose of balancing 
external threats and the differentiation of geopolitical thinking from the ideological one. 
The process of emergence of neorealist theory as a sceptical theory about liberal 
institutionalism is covered by Baldwin1 and Forde2. Neorealist theory as an independent 
theory is conceptualised by Waltz.3  
Gustavsson and Hermann analyse definition of foreign policy change and classification of 
foreign policy change. Hermann is discussing features of foreign policy change and makes a 
distinction between foreign policy change and redirection by classifying foreign policy 
outcomes by degree or by size.4 Gustavsson in his article analyses the issues by referencing 
various scholar works.5 Hermann’s and Gustavsson’s articles help this research to 
comprehend the definition of foreign policy change and redirection, since strategic 
orientation also refers to a major degree of foreign policy change to form balancing alliance.  
Strategic dimensions of foreign policy orientation with the special emphasis on external 
threats and strategic alliance formations are studied by Walt.6 Although he specifically 
focuses on the Middle Eastern alliances, general behaviours of states were also analysed in 
the theoretical framework when they confront external threats. Two distinct behaviours 
bandwagoning and balancing are compared in terms of their causes and outcomes for state’s 
                                                             
1 Baldwin D.A. “Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics” in David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (1st ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 3-25 
2 Forde, Steven. International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism. 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, 1995, pp. 141–160. 
3 Waltz, Kenneth N. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1, 
1990, pp. 21–37. 
4 Hermann, Charles F. Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy//International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, 1990, pp. 3–21. 
5 Gustavsson, Jakob How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? //Cooperation And Conflict, Vol.34, no.1, 
1999. pp. 73-95 
6 Walt, S. M. The Origins of Alliance, London: Cornell University Press, 1990.  
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foreign policy direction. Walt is depicting sources of threats as aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive power and aggressive intention. In a sense this thesis also puts external 
threats at the forefront to carry out strategic orientation, Walt’s study has made a major 
contribution to this research.  
Distinctions between geopolitical and ideological thinking is studied by Polat and Yue. Polat 
analyses features of ideological and geopolitical thinking in a theoretical base very 
comprehensively and he argues the superiority of geopolitical thinking in a sense of foreign 
policy making.7  Although Yue analyses alignment between China and Russia as the main 
subject of his article, his work covers a very significant theoretical infrastructure for this 
thesis.8 
Evolution of Turkish strategic orientation is analysed in five phases: Ataturk era, Second 
World War period, post-WWII period, Cold War period and post-Cold War period. Gonlubol 
in his book analyses many treaties, conflicts and other important events for Turkish foreign 
policy direction very comprehensively from 1919 to 1995.9 It also takes an holistic 
perspective that is not isolating issues from their international context. His book made a 
major contribution while analysing factors and outcomes of Turkish foreign policy’s 
redirections. 
Studies of Vanderlippe and Fox cover Ankara’s balancing foreign policy attitudes during the 
Second World War. Since, WWII also refers to the neutrality term of Turkish foreign policy 
just before carrying out its orientation to the West, Varderlippe’s work also provides insight 
into international factors pushing Turkey to the Western alliance post-WWII era.10 Although 
the primary object of Fox’s study is not Turkish foreign policy, it is substantial to analyse 
middle and small powers foreign policy behaviours in the international context of the given 
period.11 
In this work, I focused on three aspects of Turkish strategic orientation during Cold War era: 
the factors moving Turkey into West, outcomes of Western orientated policy on relations 
with other states and first discrepancies between Turkey and West.   
                                                             
7 Polat, S. Turkiye icin Jeopolitik Rota, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015.  
8 Yue, Ren. New Geopolitical Thinking and the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.//China Review, 1998, pp. 
83–123. 
9 Gönlubol M. Olaylarla Turk Dıs Politikası. Ankara: Siyasal, 1996. 
10VanderLippe, John M. A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II//The Historian, vol. 64, 
no. 1, 2001, pp. 63–80. 
11 Fox, A. The Power of Small States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. 
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In the post-WWII period, factors pushing Turkey to join with West are studied by Roberts12 
and Leffler13 in the framework of American financial aids, Soviet threats and Turkey’s entry 
into NATO by abandoning its neutralist foreign policy that had been pursued since 1923. 
Their articles including analysis about factors pushing Turkey to join with West in the 
framework of American financial aids and Turkey’s entry into NATO by abandoning its 
neutralist foreign policy that had been pursued since 1923. Their emphases on external threat 
perceptions of Turkey at that period of time together with new conditions of international 
politics are substantial to comprehend the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation. 
In the aftermath of Turkey’s entry into NATO, some structural changes were witnessed 
concerning Ankara’s relations with West and also relations with the USSR. This phase of 
Turkey’s foreign policy evolution was studied by Simpson, Turan and Barlas, Ulunian and 
Kunniholm. Simpson in his article with laying emphasis on domestic and economic outcomes 
of its new foreign policy direction analyses the initial NATO years of Turkey.14 Turan and 
Barlas in their article examines changing patterns of relation between Turkey and Middle 
East countries and also the article successfully draws Turkey’s new role in the Middle East 
taken in the framework of being a part of the Western alliance.15 Kunniholm and Ulunian’s 
studies include useful parts dedicated to analyse these changes. The comprehending 
developments of this era influencing Turkish foreign policy direction is substantial to analyse 
Turkey’s external threat perceptions in the beginning of Cold War and also to examine 
impacts of bipolar system on evolution of Turkish strategic orientation.16 17 
Ankara’s awareness showed up firstly with the Cyprus dispute about the boundaries of 
Western alliance on Turkey’s geopolitical interests. Campbell analyses Mediterranean Crisis 
with paying special attention to Cyprus dispute comprehensively.18 Cyprus dispute as the first 
source of discrepancies between Turkey and the West is vital for the evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy direction. This article is very helpful to comprehend Cyprus issue as a sticking 
                                                             
12 Roberts, G. Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943–8//Journal 
of Contemporary History, vol. 46, no. 1, 2011. pp. 58–81. 
13 Leffler, M. P. Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-
1952.//The Journal of American History, vol. 71, no. 4, 1985. pp. 303–323. 
14 Simpson D.J. Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey// Middle East Journal 
Vol. 19, No. 2, 1965. pp. 141–152. 
15 Turan İ., Barlas.D, “Batı İttifakına Uye Olmanın Turk Dıs Politikası Uzerindeki Etkileri”, 
Faruk Sönmezoğlu Turk Dıs Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004.  pp:425-439 
16 Kuniholm, B. Turkey and the West// Foreign Affairs, Vol:70, No.2, 1991. pp. 34–48 
17 Ulunian, A. Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58//Cold War History, Vol:3 No.2, 
2003. pp. 35-52 
18 Campbell, J. The Mediterranean Crisis//Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, No.4, 1975. pp. 605–624. 
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point between Turkey and thr West. After the emergence of Cyprus dispute, Turkish 
domestic politics underwent also important changes. Anti-NATO movements in Turkey 
gained substantial strength. Doster’s article analyses these changes.19 The article examines 
the roots of anti-NATOism in Turkish politics.  
In post-Cold War era major changes were witnessed in Turkish foreign policy thinking. Ozal 
and AKP terms refer to breaking points from traditional principals of Turkish foreign policy 
making. Uzgel analyses Ozal’s era Turkish foreign policy direction comprehensively.20 
Understanding Ozal’s era is very important in this thesis since it laid down the bases of 
identity-based attitudes in Turkish foreign policy. 
Bertrand analyses in his article transformations on Turkish foreign policy thinking in the 
AKP era.21 It is substantial for this research so as to classify AKP’s foreign policy thinking if 
it is geopolitical or ideological. This article is also helpful to understand convergence points 
between AKP and Ozal’s era foreign policy decision-makings. “Stratejik Derinlik” (Strategic 
Depth) is a conceptual book written by ex-foreign minister and ex-prime minister of Turkey 
Davutoglu.22 Since this book is regarded as the conceptual basis of AKP’s foreign policy 
aims and strategies, it made a contribution to this thesis to understand reasons of rising neo-
Ottomanist motives in Turkish foreign policy.   
Model country debates boosted after the first electoral victory of AKP in the framework of 
Greater Middle East Initiative. Steward and Fuller’s articles cover analyses about the model 
country concept. Stewart's article is helpful to grasp the model country aim of AKP in the 
Middle East in accordance with goals of GMEI.23 Fuller in his article is analysing political 
Islam and also some parts of his article are dedicated to examining the compatibility of model 
country role to Turkey by analysing Turkey’s plusses and minuses in terms of model country 
role.24 In order to understand the rise of political Islam in Turkey and American support to 
AKP, Fuller’s article is substantial for this research. 
                                                             
19 Doster, B. Turkiye’de NATO Karsıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri// Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol.4, No.40. 
2012. pp. 31-41 
20 Uzgel İ. Ozal Dönemi (1983-91) “Turk Dıs Politikası” P.48-70 
21 Bertrand, G. Turkish Diplomacy since 2003: Transition from Realpolitik to a Liberal Foreign Policy?// 
Perspectives, Vol.21, No.2, 2013. pp. 63–82 
22 Davutoglu A. Stratejik Derinlik. İstanbul: Kure, 2001 
23 Stewart D.J. The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination// 
Geographical Review, Vol.95, No.3, 2015. pp. 400–424. 
24 Fuller, G.  The Future of Political Islam// Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.2, 2002. pp. 48–60. 
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Another article is dedicated to challenges in Turkish domestic policy which was written by 
Abramowitz and Barkey.25 This article is substantial for this research in a sense of analysing 
internal challenges for AKP to undertake the model country role. Schanzer and Tahiroglu 
also examine AKP’s model country policy concerning Arab Spring.26 It is very helpful to 
understand the role of identity-based thinking in AKP era foreign policy making. 
Under the title of threats, four main subjects are studied in this thesis with special emphasis: 
Cyprus, Kurdish, Aegean and Gulen Organisation. Cyprus issue was studied with its various 
aspects under Crawshaw, Camp, Hakki and Gorvett. Crawshaw’s article in the sense of 
containing many important turning points further led to the collapse of bi-communal Cyprus 
Republic is significant.27  Camp analyses important developments in a long period of time 
from the 1950s to 1970s including first internal conflicts between two societies, involvement 
of external actors and the UN efforts concerning Cyprus together with the geopolitical 
significance of Cyprus.28 Hakki analyses development of Cyprus issue from 1878 to 2006, his 
work is one of the most comprehensive resources and it also contains many primary sources 
including treaties, constitutions and letters concerning Cyprus issue.29 Gorvett analyses in his 
article current situation in Cyprus and the energy aspect of issue.30 
The Kurdish issue is covered by works of Perincek, Fuller and Stein and Ricciardone.  
Perincek in his book analyses the evolution of Kurdish issue since the foundation of PKK. 
The book especially lays emphasis on changing external links of PKK from the Cold War to 
the present time. Perincek also analyses the process that PKK turned to a sticking point 
between Turkey and West.31 Fuller’s article is an important material for my research since it 
takes the issue with its regional and international dimensions. Besides that, the article also 
informs about how the issue turned to be a human rights issue for the West.32 Stein and 
Ricciardone in their articles focus on current discrepancies between the US and Turkey over 
PKK or PYD. The article demonstrates American concerns over Turkey’s attitudes regarding 
                                                             
25 Abramowitz, M., & Barkey, H. J.. Turkey's Transformers// Foreign Affairs Vol.88, No.6, 2009. pp. 118–128. 
26 Schanzer and Tahiroglu. Ankara's Failure//Foreign Affairs. January 22, 2016. URL: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-01-25/ankaras-failure (accessed 22.03.2017) 
27 Crawshaw, N. Cyprus: Collapse of the Zurich Agreement// The World Today Vol.20, No.8, 1964. pp. 338–
347. 
28 Camp, G. Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus//Political Science Quarterly, Vol.95, No.1, 1980.  pp. 43–70. 
29 Hakki, M. The Cyprus Issue London: I.B. Tauris, 2008. 
30 Gorvett, J. One Cyprus?//Foreign Affairs, October 27, 2016 URL: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cyprus/2016-10-27/one-cyprus (accessed:15.02.2017) 
31 Perincek D., Turkiye Solu ve PKK, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014. 
32 Fuller, G. The Fate of the Kurds//Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.2, 1993. pp. 108–121. 
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PYD and also Ankara’s concerns over America’s close relations with PYD that is considered 
by Turkey as the Syrian wing of PKK. 33 
Gulen issue was studied with its various aspects under Perincek, Enghall and Karavelli. 
Perincek is paying special attention on Gulen-West relations and also deeply analyses reasons 
that allow Gulen’s sympathisers to take strategic positions in Turkish bureaucracy. The book 
analyses Gulenist Organisation’s activities from the 1960s to coup d’état. In order to 
comprehend deteriorating Turkey-West relations attempt and Turkey-Russia instant 
rapprochement after July 15th coup d’état attempt, the book also presents very 
comprehensive analyses. Enghall in his article is examining Gulenists’ worldwide network. 
Karavelli in his article is analysing the relations between AKP and Gulen from coalition term 
to the confrontation. It is also significant to understand issues breaking cooperation between 
AKP and Gulen. 
Empirical Basis: 
This thesis besides various books and articles benefits from primary sources including a 
letter, an intelligence report, agreements and public speeches. These primary sources can be 
divided into four main groups: official international documents, legislative documents, 
executive documents and public statements by officials. 
Official international documents are analysed in this thesis. This kind of documents helped 
this research to understand the position and effects of international bodies on specific issues. 
For this purpose, reactions of the UN regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish disputes are tracked 
by the official international documents. Several UN documents including Security Council 
reports and the resolutions are analysed to understand the official position of the UN. For 
instance, The Resolution 688 adopted April 5th, 1991 is an important document for this 
research since the resolution was taken as the pretext of a no-fly zone by the US-led 
coalition.34  
Speaking of legislative documents, several treaties are also covered in this research. The 
treaties in the sense of demonstrating legal frameworks of issues made a contribution this 
                                                             
33 Ricciardone D. and Stein A. Mitigating US-Turkish Disagreement over the PYD// Atlantic Council, February 
24, 2016. URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mitigating-us-turkish-disagreement-over-the-
pyd (accessed: 15.03.2017) 
34 UN Security Council Resolution 688, adopted: April 5, 1991 // Security Council Resolution. URL: 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed: 20.02.2017) 
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research. “Treaty of Peace with Italy”35 and “Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus”36 are some of the treaties analysed for this purpose in this research. And 
also some points of a report of Turkish Parliamentary Investigation Committee on the Gulen 
Organisation dated January 2017 is used in order to understand Turkey’s perspective towards 
the Gulen Organisation after the coup d’état attempt.37 
Furthermore, a certain number of executive documents are analysed in this research to 
comprehend various international actors’ position on specific issues. For instance, Helsinki 
Presidency Conclusions dated December 1999 demonstrates the attitudes of the EU towards 
Cyprus accession.38 For the sake of another example, US Department of State Press Briefing 
dated March 8, 2017 made a contribution to this research in the sense of comprehending 
American position on armed Kurdish groups in Syria.39  
Several public speeches are covered in this thesis so as to grasp the position of actors on 
specific issues and to back this research with the first-hand evidence. Concerning to analyse 
roots of the distinction between identity-based and geopolitical attitudes in Turkish foreign 
policy, Ataturk’s Speech in Turkish Parliament dated December 1st, 1921 addresses directly 
this issue.40 And also Bush’s address dated January 29th, 1991 in the sense of showing new 
principles of American foreign policy in post-Cold War is another public statement made a 
contribution to this research.41 
Besides the sources mentioned above, different types of primary sources were also analysed 
in this thesis including declassified intelligence reports, newspaper materials and so on. 
  
                                                             
35 Treaty of Peace with Italy, (1947), URL: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000004-
0311.pdf (accessed: 01.04.2017) 
36 Treaty Concerning The Establishment Of The Republic Of Cyprus, 16.08.1969, URL: 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1961/TS0004.pdf (accessed:16.01.2017) 
37 FETÖ/PDY Darbe Girisimi Meclis Komisyonu Raporu// TBMM Parliamentary Investigation Committee 
Report, October 19, 2016.  
38 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions//European Parliament Official Website, DECEMBER 10-
11, 1999 URL:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (accessed 10.01.2017) 
39 US Department of State Press Briefing by Mark C. Toner// US. Department of State, March 8, 2017. URL: 
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Chronological Limit: 
The drivers of major Turkish foreign policy shifts are examined in the timespan from 1919 - 
to the present day. This time span is set in this research because Turkish Independence War 
began in 1919 and it laid the foundation of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. 
Methodology: 
Two different research methods have been employed to this qualitative work. The conceptual 
and methodological bases are developed in the first section based on four main elements: 
neorealist theory, foreign policy change, balance-of-threat theory, and geopolitical thinking. 
The third chapter is devoted to the problem of the crisis of pro-Western strategic orientation 
by analysing a number of cases of perennial threats that are to be balanced through alliance 
formation. The cases are chosen as Cyprus dispute, Kurdish issue, Aegean disputes and 
Gulen organisation. Regarding the distinguishing feature of these cases from the others, they 
pose threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity or its regime. For instance, Armenian genocide 
claims is also a challenge for Turkish diplomacy for a long time but it does not pose a direct 
threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity or its regime.  
While analysing the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation, the historical descriptive 
methodological approach is also frequently used in this research. The importance of 
comprehending issues in their historical retrospective is compulsory for this thesis to 
distinguish constant (strategic) issues from temporary (identity-based) issues.  
Structure: 
This thesis is organised as follows. The first chapter is devoted to generate the theoretical and 
conceptual framework of this research in order to examine the drivers of strategic orientation. 
The second chapter focuses on the evolution of Turkish strategic orientation for the purpose 
of analysing the impetuses of Turkey’s foreign policy reorientations since the beginning of 
the Turkish Independence War in 1919. The third chapter analyses the external threats of 
Turkey and their connection with Turkey’s inconsistent alliance formation. And at the 
conclusion, we will present the findings of this study and sum up the contribution of this 
study to literature.     
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Chapter 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
1.1: Neorealist Theory 
Neorealism or structural realism emerged as a response of growing attractiveness of idealist 
approaches in international relations. Structural realism claims that state is a dominant actor 
in the international realm, and other actors such as NGOs are not as determinant as states in 
terms of their capabilities and power.42 Structural realism is a sceptical theory about the 
liberal institutionalist claim of growing interdependence in IR, in which neorealist scholars 
emphasise the substance of a system and the importance of great powers by using relatively 
more scientific methods to avoid ethical evaluation such as evil or good.43 
Waltz states that for understanding international politics, there is only one clear way, this is 
through setting up system theories. A theory has to be designated as the independent domain 
from other international realms examples being in the economic or social realms. In order to 
demonstrate this issue of how international and domestic political structures are formed and 
to show which characteristics affect these structures apart from international economic and 
international social domain, he suggests to mark off international political domain to 
distinguish it from other international domains and distinguishing system-level forces from 
unit level-forces.44 
In contrast to classical realist arguments that rest on the discussions about human nature such 
as “struggle for power”, Waltz apparently endeavours to avoid this discussion about human 
nature. In contrast to Morgenthau who put human nature on the core position of his analysis, 
he tends to pay more attention to positivist approaches. As he pays more attention to 
positivist approaches, these stimulate him to evaluate behaviours of states as predictable. 
Structural realism seeks accordance between its propositions and empirical evidences. It 
indicates the causal conditions under which certain political outcomes can be expected.45 
Waltz highlights the structure of the international system by distinguishing internal from 
external realms. International structures are determined by ordering the principles of the 
system. The structure of the system is the best way to understand states’ behaviour.  The 
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political structures are defined by the ordering principles of the system also known as anarchy 
and by the distribution of capabilities across units. According to Waltz, there are two ordering 
principles hierarchy and anarchy. These respectively depict the domestic and international 
realms. In other words, two possibilities exist: units are either under authority (hierarchy), or 
not (anarchy). This is the main determiner in terms of structure and also there is a distinct 
difference between conducting policy in the realm of hierarchy and the conducting policy in 
the realm of anarchy in terms of their respective characteristics.46  
Waltz recommends a three-part definition for domestic policy: the first, by ordering principle, 
secondly, by the character of units and third, distribution of capabilities. Firstly, the units of 
domestic political systems operate in a relation of superior-subordinate. While some actors 
give the order, others obey the order. Secondly, hierarchy makes units different, the 
specification of functions provide units different objectives. Thirdly, distribution of 
capabilities makes changes possible in the structure.47 
In comparison, the core of international relations is the system that is anarchy rather than 
hierarchy. The characteristics of international interactions based on the fact that absence of 
superior authority in IR. The absence of any governments over states in the international 
realm is also known as international anarchy is part of the structure in international relations 
and it marks off states’ behaviours to a large extent.48 In contrast with this, actors whose act 
in domestic policy comprises of different units, in the international realm the functional 
differences among units were diminished by the system (anarchy), therefore states imitate 
each other.49 
Even though every international structure is anarchy and this fact eradicates the difference to 
a large extent, political structures are distinguishable between each other only in a way of 
differences on the distribution of capabilities or distribution of power, even though every unit 
is equal formally. “In an anarchic realm, structures are defined in terms of their major units. 
International structures vary with significant changes in the number of great powers. Great 
powers are marked off from others by the combined capabilities they command. When their 
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numbers changed consequentially, the calculations and behaviours of states, and the 
outcomes their interactions produce vary.”50  
Great powers have the biggest role in the international domain. Robert Gilpin focuses on the 
distribution of power on the system. According to him, power is not distributed among actors 
equally. Great powers that desire to maximise their national interest determine changes in the 
system as a result of their interactions between each other. Therefore an essential step in the 
system is the desire of great powers that to construct, prevent and sustain political domination 
of whole system, also known as “hegemony”. 51 
Great powers fear one another. There is always a possibility that states can betray each other. 
They worry about intentions of other states, the biggest fear originated from possibility to be 
subjected attack by other states. The features of international system stimulate these fears, as 
it is self-help system. There is no rescuer for any state in danger in the international system. 
As Mearsheimer states, “When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody 
in the international system to answer the call.”52 
1.2: Defining Strategic Orientation 
“Strategic orientation” is a concept originally used in the fields of economy and finance. 
Strategic orientation in general using refers to efforts for the best policy choosing for agents. 
This process needs to be backed up by a substantial analysis measuring agents’ strength, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats in current conditions. Strategies especially the ones 
holding long-term expectations are determined out of SWOT analysis.  
Speaking of IR discipline, strategic orientation is not a very popular concept. Moreover, 
identical calculation of agents’ SWOT in IR discipline is not as simple as economic sciences. 
Therefore it is necessary to revise the concept in accordance with the structure of 
international relations. Strategic orientation concept in international relations is a concept that 
determining countries’ long-term foreign policy strategies in response to threats of a country. 
Charles Hermann makes the distinction between foreign policy redirection and foreign policy 
change. While he identifies former as a result of transformations took place in regime or 
state, later is defined as a result of foreign policy makers’ choices. He introduces four 
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graduated levels of change categorising foreign policy change by means of the degree of 
change. First is “adjustment changes” which refer to qualitative changes in efforts and in the 
scope of interactions to achieve particular goals. Second-degree change is labelled as 
“program changes” and it refers to quantitative transformations in methods or by involving 
new methods. The third one is named “problem/goal changes”, it refers to the replacement of 
problem or goal which is targeted by foreign policy of a country. Finally, the last change is 
the most radical one of a country’s foreign policy which is redrawing a country’s foreign 
affairs across the world, which he labels “international orientation change”.53  
Rosati concentrates on the phenomena of foreign policy change; just as Hermann, he divides 
foreign changes into different levels by scope. In his model, foreign policy changes may take 
place which are labelled as intensification, refinement, reform and restructuring and they 
refer to changes “little, minor, moderate and major changes place in the scope, goals and 
strategy”.54 Moreover, Kalevi Holsti focuses on major and radical changes in foreign policy 
which are explained by Hermann and Rosati. He distinguishes change and restructuring in 
foreign policy. He classifies restructuring in four types: isolation, self-reliance, dependence 
and diversification.55  
Change in foreign policy direction is an interesting phenomenon since it may be derived from 
various reasons both external and internal. Foreign policy change is a constant issue just like 
Heraclitus observed that “You could not step twice into the same rivers; for other waters are 
ever flowing on to you.”56 But the level of foreign policy change diversifies in parallel with 
the level of threat. 
With respect to reasons for major shifts in a state’s foreign policy direction, other factors 
have less importance than security issues. An actor should take into account conditions of 
international politics and it should develop foreign policy strategies according to security 
issues primarily. According to Walt, grand strategies themselves are seeking to provide 
security for a nation state. He defines strategy as “a set of hypotheses or predictions”.57 
Therefore, on the bases of Walt’s definition of strategy, it is true to argue that placing a state 
to a secured alliance system in IR taking into account alternative directions, various scenarios 
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and so on is a strategy. On the other hand, this strategy aims to reorient a state to a different 
position to ensure its security.  
Furthermore, in the anarchy, the primary objective of states is survival, because states are 
responsible for their fate, there is no superior authority concerning others’ fate. When they 
confront external threats, there is no superior authority would help to a threatened state. 
States, therefore, have to ensure their security themselves in advance. It does not refer to a 
claim that forming alliances between sovereign units are not possible. On the other way 
around external threats that states faced are driving forces of forming alliances in the 
international realm. 
The change in foreign policy concept of a nation state is continuous. But the volume of 
foreign policy change is not constant. It depends on capabilities of the nation state and threats 
that the nation state comes across in the international sphere.58 By taking into account 
capabilities and threats, the deepness of foreign policy change is determined. When the nation 
states come across external threats, a need of foreign policy change becomes inevitable for 
them. In order to carry out necessary change, they are obliged to review their position in 
international sphere.  
Nation states form alliances as long as their strategic interests are compatible to certain 
extend. At least an alliance must secure each side’s national interests to some degree. The 
very fundamental issue for the nation states is the survival despite the perpetually changing 
international sphere. States are obliged to change their foreign policy direction, when they 
cannot balance external threats. This obligation is called strategic orientation. 
1.3: Alliance Formation to Balance External Threats 
Speaking of forming alliances, states’ behaviours would be diversified in two different forms: 
balancing or bandwagoning, when they confront external threats. States may behave in a 
balancing way to defend themselves against superior threatening states by forming an alliance 
for the purpose of balancing threatening state. On the other hand, bandwagoning behaviour 
refers to form an alliance with the threatening actor in order to tolerate and appease it. Even 
though these two diverse behaviours may be pursued by states in case they face with external 
threats, in both scenarios place an external threat as the underlying reason for forming 
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alliances. Therefore, those states that place their security at risk follow bandwagoning or 
balancing strategies to deal with the external threat. 59 
In international politics, every nation state seeks to carry out its objectives and strives to 
preserve its security. In order to materialise these tasks, they have to avoid loneliness by 
forming alliances with other states. Constant and overlapping long-term interests primarily 
security issues and other life-sustaining issues play a primary role for nation states to take a 
position in the international political sphere. In this sense strategic orientation concept aims to 
place a country in a secured position. 
With whom, states prefer to form an alliance to deal with external threats is another question 
of the strategic orientation concept. In this point, Walt suggests that states’ behaviours are 
diversified in two different forms: balancing or bandwagoning, in case they confront external 
threats. States may behave in a balancing way to defend themselves against superior 
threatening states by forming an alliance for the purpose of balancing the threatening state. 
On the other hand, bandwagoning behaviour refers to forming an alliance with the 
threatening actor in order to tolerate and appease it. Even though these two diverse 
behaviours may be pursued by states in case they face with external threats, in both scenarios 
existence of external threats is the underlying reason for forming alliances. Therefore, those 
states that place their security at risk follow bandwagoning or balancing strategies to deal 
with the external threat. 60 
However, states very rarely prefer to bandwagoning. Only under certain conditions, states 
join with dominant external threats: firstly, if there is no balancing external power to form 
alliance against the external threat, states can join with threatening states. Secondly, if states 
believe that external threats could be appeased by bandwagoning, they may ally with 
threatening states. 61 Nevertheless, it is evident to say that great powers and regional powers 
are very unlikely to bandwagon, since strength itself is a feature making a state attractive to 
be selected as an ally by others. According to Walt, declining power of a state leads its allies 
to choose a neutral foreign policy or at the worst scenario to join with its enemies.62    
States are prone to opt for balancing behaviour when they confront with external threats. In 
other words, states are likely to form alliance against external threats. Yet, another issue for 
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states is choosing their allies. Since this work in accordance with neorealist theory argues that 
allies are chosen in order to balance external threats; the determination process of external 
threats is one of the primary tasks of this paper. Therefore alliance formation for states is a 
result of balancing efforts of states to cope with external threats. 
Speaking of the balance of threat theory, a state is prone to form an alliance with the other 
international actors which are perceived as the least dangerous. In order to assess the level of 
threat, Walt suggests looking into four sources of threat: aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions.63  
First of all, aggregate power refers to a state’s total resources (industrial, military and 
technologic capabilities). Moreover, a potential threat that constituted by a state for others is 
directly proportionate with the aggregate power of the state. Yet still, power at the same time 
can make a state more attractive to be allied with.64 Thus, power by itself can be a source of 
threat and alignment. 
Second, geographic proximity can be a source of threat. According to Walt, states which are 
located nearby pose a higher level of threat than those which are located far away. Yet still, 
geographic proximity is not enough to create a threat to other, it has to be taken into account 
with states’ intention and their ability to project their power to others.  
Third, “offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of 
another state at an acceptable cost.”65 A state’s offensive power can provoke others to 
bandwagon or balance. The level of offensive power can pose a potential threat; it can be 
used in order to deter others or to violate others’ sovereignty but in any case, it poses a threat 
to others when it is combining with other sources of threat. 
Finally, the intention is a complementary source of the threat. Those states that hold three 
mentioned sources of threat, without aggressive intentions cannot be taken as external threats 
for others. 66 Therefore, the perception of intention is a determiner of external threats 
combining with other three sources of threat. At this point, attitudes of foreign policy makers 
gain significance. In order to determine threats, this paper examines two distinct ways of 
thinking namely geopolitical and ideological one. 
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1.4: Predicting Others’ Foreign Policy 
Geopolitics of a country draws framework of long-term interests, opportunities and the 
challenges of a country. Napoleon states that “If you know country’s geography, you can 
understand and predict its foreign policy”.67 The governments acting in accordance with 
geopolitical facts manage to keep their countries away from security threats. The 
miscalculation of geopolitical opportunities drags countries to disaster. Therefore foreign 
policy makers should take major foreign policy issues as matters of geopolitics. 
Ideological patterns may cover up bigger geopolitical confrontations but the underlying cause 
of major international confrontations is geopolitics. Therefore, if the political administration 
of a country is predominated by ideological concerns regarding international issues, this 
causes to develop unrealistic strategies which are not upholding needs of the country.68 
Speaking of settling the allies or enemies of a country, strategic factors such as security 
should be taken into account primarily. 
Furthermore, the countries which have consultation mechanism and check and balance 
mechanisms in their foreign policy making process are bounded by a legal framework.69  
Domestic exploitation of strategic foreign policy issues by a political administration is very 
dangerous in a matter of strategic orientation of a country. If the policy makers make use of 
strategic foreign policy issues for domestic cyclical issues, this causes to miscalculation of 
one’s own strength or capabilities. Mostly authoritarian administrations crow over their 
failures in international sphere to their publics as a success. For example, before the Saddam 
and Gaddafi administrations were overthrown in Iraq and in Libya, they had glorified their 
international activities for the purpose of attracting their nations. Even though it allowed them 
to stay in power till they died, both leaders’ adventurism could not prevent foreign 
occupation and eventually, these two countries collapsed in terms of politics, economy and 
security. In this sense, it is evident to say that ideological feature of a country domestically in 
order to avoid countries from unrealistic adventures plays an important role. Therefore we 
may say that these countries in a sense of limiting foreign policy adventurisms domestically 
are more advantageous at carrying out their strategic orientation.  
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1.5: Sources of Geopolitical Thinking 
The international politics cannot be isolated from geopolitical space. All the foreign policy 
actions of the actors are staged in the international sphere. But every development in 
geopolitical space does not affect international politics to the same degree. When a major 
degree of changes takes place in geopolitical space, they have unavoidable impacts on 
international politics and nation states are obliged to take a position by reassessing the newly 
emergent geopolitical situation.  
Defining geopolitics is a tough task and it is beyond the aim of this paper. Yet still, because 
of a major role of geopolitical thinking on predicting other’s intentions, we need to draw a 
short framework of geopolitics. With a very basic way of thinking, it is concerning 
interactions between space and politics. Beyond this basic understanding, there are various 
interpretations of geopolitics. 
According to traditional explanation of geopolitics, great powers strive to expand their sphere 
of interests in line with their capability of projecting power and it places great powers to the 
centre of geopolitical issues. On the other hand, new geopolitical thinking puts forward 
changeable feature by geopolitical analysis.70 Nevertheless, both place a major importance 
the interactions between space and politics.71  
According to Dugin, geopolitics is derived from a contrast between sea and land. Without 
taking into account that dualism, geopolitics cannot be comprehended. Geopolitics is neither 
one-dimensional nor fully-symmetrical discipline. Land and sea powers have different 
interests determined by their different geographic locations; therefore they inevitably pursue 
conflicting policies to overcome these different challenges in the same geopolitical space. 
Then there is a big difference between the perception of land power and sea-power.72  
Besides the various interpretations of geopolitics, geopolitical thinking of foreign policy 
makers refers to the intensification of attention to realistic geopolitical indicators rather than 
unrealistic references.73 Moreover, speaking of predicting others’ intention, geopolitical 
thinking contributes formulation of states’ foreign policy strategies as goals of actors despite 
the time are mostly constant. For example, Homer in the Illiad tells Trojan War. In the war, 
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Greek side made an alliance led by Achilles against Trojans and they landed West Anatolia. 
On the other side states in Anatolia made an alliance led by Trojans and their greatest warrior 
was Hector. A war between two different civilisations took place and as a result, Greek 
gained a victory against Trojans. The famous phrase “We take the revenge of Hector by 
conquering Constantinople” attributes to Mehmed the Conqueror. The same phrase uttered by 
Ataturk after he won the battle against British-backed Greek occupiers in Turkish freedom 
war.74 Although entities on the spatial structure change by time, views of actors locating in 
identical geographic places are more constant defining enemies and alliances.  
Aron defines geopolitics as "geographical schematization of diplomatic-strategic relations 
with a geographic-economic analysis of resources, with an interpretation of diplomatic 
attitudes as a result of the way of life and of the environment.”75 Geopolitical thinking is 
basically situated in the common framework of realist theories. First of all, it puts forward 
national independence and territorial integrity in a defensive way as the main objective of 
decision makers.76 Secondly, it seeks ways of cooperation regardless of the ideological 
structure of actors but taking into account threats and possibilities to balance the threats. 
Finally, geopolitical constrains directs decision makers to embrace geopolitical thinking and 
when a state comes across superior external threats, geopolitical thinking turns into an 
obligation for decision makers in the direction of carrying out the strategic orientation of the 
state. 
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Chapter 2: Evolution of Turkey’s Strategic Orientation Problem 
2.1 Ataturk Era 
For comprehending Turkish foreign policy during Ataturk era, we should take into account 
Ottoman’s last term. Ottoman Empire reached its peak in the 15th century in terms of 
economy, politics and military, but Renaissance and Enlightenment in the framework of 
rising European civilisation could not be adopted sufficiently. Industry revolution and 
scientific developments could not be pursued. While European countries got wealthy thanks 
to expanding their colonies all over the World, Ottoman Empire weakened. As of French 
revolution, nation states began to rise against empires. The dissolution of empires by rising 
nation states boosted in Eurasia in the 19th century and similar developments were witnessed 
in the Ottoman Empire. The first uprising was carried out in 1804 by Serbians and it was 
followed by Greeks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians and Armenians. The last century of 
Ottoman Empire, filled with fights including First World War to defend its territorial 
integrity. The aftermath of the World War, Turkish Independence War was masterminded by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk against Western occupant states and Turkey was founded. 
From the end of the First World War, Ankara government pursued realist foreign policy. The 
ideological concerns were separated from foreign policy making. Geopolitical thinking 
dominated Turkish foreign policy strategies. Turkish strategic orientation was carried out 
successfully. Ataturk states the realist essence of early term Turkish foreign policy: 
“Gentlemen! Every one of our compatriots and coreligionists may nourish a high ideal in his mind; 
he is free to do so... But the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, 
positive, material policy, and that, gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and 
independence... within defined national frontiers. The Grand National Assembly and government of 
Turkey, in the name of the nation they represent, are very modest, very far from fantasies, and 
completely realistic.... Gentlemen, we are not men who run after great fantasies and present a 
fraudulent appearance of doing things which in fact we cannot do. Gentlemen, by looking as though 
we were doing great and fantastic things, without actually doing them, we have brought the hatred, 
rancour, and malice of the whole world on this country and this people. We did not serve pan-
Islamism. We said that we had and we would, but we didn't, and our enemies said: "Let us kill them at 
once before they do!" We did not serve pan-Turanianism. We said that we could and we would, and 
again they said: "Let us kill them!" There you have the whole problem.... Rather than run after ideas, 
which we did not and could, not realise and thus increase number of our enemies and the pressure 
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upon us, let us return to our natural, legitimate limits. And let us know our limits. Gentlemen, we are 
a nation desiring life and independence“77 
Ankara government liberated Turkey by fighting against Western states and against the 
Istanbul government sponsored by Western states. The Turkish Independence War itself was 
a good example of strategic orientation. Ankara government and Bolsheviks formed an 
alliance at the strategic level which was not based on ideological convergence but taking into 
account geopolitical necessities of both sides. In this direction Lenin’s statement to Aralov 
for Ataturk demonstrates unideological roots of the alliance: “Of course Mustafa Kemal 
Pasha is not a socialist, but a good organiser and a national bourgeois revolutionary and we 
will support his movement in all manner.”78  
Under favour of the strategic alliance, Kemalists and Bolsheviks put ideological concerns 
aside and formed a strategic cooperation also in the Caucasia. The Allies constituted a kind of 
wall in Transcaucasia to keep Baku oils, to block Iran and Iraq way. “The blockade” was 
relied on pro-British governments namely Tashnak government in Armenia, the Menshevik 
government in Georgia and Musavat government in Azerbaijan. The British envoy for 
Caucasia sent a telegraph to Lord Curzon on 3 January 1920 stating the British expectation 
from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan by “the blockade” to constitute strong block and to 
prevent Bolshevik and Kemalist interaction. Churchill, in his diary, states the British 
expectation from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan by “the blockade” to constitute strong 
block and to prevent Bolshevik and Kemalist interaction. Against the blockade the Eastern 
Front operation launched by Kemalists under command of Kazım Karabekir with the support 
of Bolsheviks in September of 1920 and Turkey ensured the Eastern support. According to 
the Kars Treaty, Ardahan were given to Turkey and Batumi was remained with Soviet 
Georgia. After that, Kars Treaty was signed between TBMM, Soviet Armenia, Soviet 
Azerbaijan and Soviet Georgia on 13 October 1921. With Bolsheviks came to power in 
Trans-Caucasia most of the Turkish troops settled in the Eastern part of Turkey were shifted 
to the Western fronts. This laid down the basis of Turkish Independence War strategy to 
liberate Western part of Turkey, which was under invasion, was establishing a secured zone 
in the Eastern Turkey and launching a war against occupiers settling in the Western part. 79 
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While Lenin era Soviet aids were vital for Turkey, the Turkish defence of the Straits and the 
Eastern Front Operation held vital importance for the Bolsheviks. This was important for 
halting Western influence in the region. In this sense, the alliance was formed on the basis of 
geopolitical facts. Geopolitics surpassed ideological differences existing between Turkey and 
the Soviet Union. Despite the strategic alliance with the Soviet Union during the 
Independence War, Turkey fought against Western states.  
In the aftermath of the Independence War of Turkey, Turkey sought to develop relations also 
with the West. With the Lausanne Treaty, Ankara gained international recognition and turned 
the only representative of the country. Ankara government adopted a non-involvement policy 
for issues that are not directly concerning Turkey.80 Moreover, Turkey became a member of 
the League of Nation in 1932.81  
Generally speaking, with the exception of the issues directly linked with Turkey’s territorial 
integrity, Turkey avoided direct confrontations with the West. However, some critical issues 
inherited from Ottoman Empire remained alive between Turkey and the West. The Ankara 
government made good use of Turkey’s geopolitical position by forming well-balanced 
relations between the Soviet and Western governments. Turkish government strived to orient 
its foreign policy direction between West and the Soviet Union.  Turkey’s foreign policy in 
this era could be depicted as the realist and modest. Turkey sought to develop relations with 
the West but at the same time, Ankara strived to solve disputes with other states in the region 
to hinder involvement of the Western States to regional and domestic politics. 
One of them was a dispute over the status of the Straits as they remained under international 
supervision. While Turkey sought to demilitarise the straits, it could not be accepted at the 
Lausanne Conference. Afterward, when Italian and German expansionisms began to rise, 
Ankara by making use of its geopolitical importance brought the issue back to the League of 
Nations and the dispute was solved in favour of Turkey by signing on to Montreux Straits 
Convention with Bulgaria, France, Britain, Japan, Romania, the USSR, Yugoslavia and 
Greece in 1936.82 
Secondly, the biggest unsolved problem remaining between Turkey and the British Empire as 
a sticking point was the Mosul issue. Mosul was a part of Turkey according to the Turkish 
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National Pact but Britain invaded this energy-rich region out of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire. Even though the Ankara government risked in an armed conflict for Mosul, 
British-backed uprising blew up in the east of Turkey and Mosul was remained with Britain 
as a result of League of Nations decision.83 
Thirdly, Hatay was an Ottoman province but with the dissolution of Ottoman, it remained to 
French Mandate of Syria. Under favour of long efforts of the Ankara in League of Nations 
combining with tensioning relations in the Europe, international conditions turned out to 
Ankara’s favour. Regarding Hatay and Syria, France had to pursue more passive policy. 
Hatay became independent in 1938 and then it was attached to Turkey in 1939. 84 
In the aftermath of the Turkish Independence War, Ankara’s foreign policy could be defined 
as minimalist. Turkey concentrated on ensuring its territorial integrity not pursued any 
expansionist policy. Ankara’s efforts to get back Mosul and Hatay were originated from 
Turkish National Pact, indicating these territories parts of Turkey.85 Although Ankara did not 
pursue an expansionist policy, Turkey strived to fill geopolitical void arising from the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire to a certain degree. These regionalism efforts were taken 
as a matter of Turkey’s security in the early post-Ottoman era. For this purpose, the Balkan 
Pact was founded on Ankara’s initiation among Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 
1934. While the Balkan Pact ensured peace in the Balkans, it also aimed at contributing to the 
status-quo against rising fascism in Europe.86 Moreover, the Saidabad Pact was established 
between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan on Turkey’s initiation in 1937. The Pact aimed at 
ensuring regional security and sorting out problems within the region, in an attempt to 
minimise external powers’ influence on regional issues. Moreover, rising Italian 
expansionism stimulated the regionalism efforts in the region. 87 
2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy during Second World War  
Even in the beginning of the 1930s, European politics had already begun to be strained again. 
German and Italian dissatisfaction with the status-quo was becoming increasingly visible.88 In 
spite of the tense environment in international politics, Turkey strived to pursue a non-
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involvement policy and to preserve its relations with all parties in any disputes unless the 
dispute was concerning Turkey’s security directly. The annexation of Czechoslovakia by 
Germany and of Albania by Italy prompted security-related concerns in Turkey. Turkey had 
to review its neutral attitude in international politics in accordance with new threat 
perception. Firstly, in spite of the Ankara attempted to extend nonaggression treaty with the 
Soviet Union but it was abolished due to the fact that Russia signed a nonaggression treaty 
with Germany. The revealing doubts about expansionist goals of Soviet Russia pushed 
Turkey to seek to develop relations with the West.89 
Turkey signed a mutual assistance agreement with Britain and France. This agreement 
stipulated French and British aid to Turkey in the event of German aggression targeting 
Turkey. In return, the agreement stipulated that Turkey would support French and British 
naval forces in case of extending the war to Mediterranean Sea. Yet still, under the terms of 
this special contract, Turkey did not have to fulfil the commitments in case they led to a war 
with the Soviet Union. As a result of this rapprochement between Turkey and the West, 
France renounced all of the claims on Hatay province and left its control to Turkish 
government on June 23, 1939.90  
Britain twice called Turkey to engage in the war by resting on the mutual assistance 
agreement signed in May 1940 and in 1941. The first time Turkey was called on to join the 
war when Germany attacked France on account of the fact that the war extended to the 
Mediterranean Sea by German aggression to France. In response, Turkey rejected to take part 
in the war on the pretext of the special contract with regards to the Soviet Union. In 1941, the 
British called on Turkey to get in the war against Germany but once again Turkey denied it 
on the pretext of delay of British arms transfers to Turkey.91  
Furthermore, Germany also wanted to draw Turkey to its side. Germany was a significant 
economy for the newly developing Turkish economy and trade between Turkey and Germany 
increased during 1930’s. In 1938, 44 percent of Turkish supplies went to Germany and 11 
percent of Turkish imports came from Germany. While Turkey imported industrial products, 
manufactured goods and munitions from Germany, Germany’s imports consisted of mostly 
agricultural products. Therefore, Turkey had rational reasons to avoid deterioration of its 
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relations with Germany.92 On 18 June 1941, Turkey and Germany signed a friendship 
agreement. According to this agreement, Turkey and Germany guaranteed each other to not 
involve any actions which could endanger one another directly or indirectly. Although 
Turkey halted all relations with Germany on 2 August 1944, Turkey managed to continue its 
policy of neutrality till very last stage of the war. Turkey declared war against the Axis states 
in the final stage of the war; this declaration even though formality, contributed Turkey’s 
following relations with the West.93  
During World War II Turkey managed to preserve its neutrality inherited from Ataturk era to 
a certain extent. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy was not fully oriented to any sides. As the 
Axis and Allied states willed to draw small states to their side, their policy towards to small 
states also aimed at preventing these states from engagement with the other side. Therefore, 
Turkey managed to maintain autonomy in foreign policy by making relatively unsubstantial 
concessions and avoiding firm commitments. Turkey neither fully integrated to one side nor 
made the others enemy, even though it announced a symbolic war against Germany in the 
end of the war.94  
2.3 NATO membership process (1947-1952) 
Ending World War II with the defeat of Axis powers brought international politics new 
institutions, new perceptions and new principles. Besides that, most European states 
weakened by the war. This led them to be more dependent on the US and the USSR. In the 
bipolar feature of the post-war era, the world was divided into two camps under two 
superpowers.95  
The one-party system came to an end in Turkey and with the following elections; the 
Democrat Party (DP) came to power. However, any major breakages were not witnessed in 
the sense of Turkish foreign policy direction. DP managed to accomplish the NATO 
participation goal of Turkey that was applied in CHP term. Nevertheless, DP’s open-market 
economy view combined with the revealing bipolar international system pushed Turkey to 
become dependent on the Western states in terms of security and economy. 
The implicit reason of Turkish wishes of being a NATO member was due to increasing 
Soviet aggressiveness over the Straits. On 21 March 1945, the Soviet Union announced not to 
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prolong the pact of non-aggression which was signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union 
in 1925. In addition, the Soviet Union claimed some concessions on Turkish Straits in spite 
of the Montreux Convention which solved the Straits issue favouring Turkey and other Black 
Sea states. Since the Straits were the only route to access Mediterranean Sea for the Soviet 
Union, the Soviets proposed that the straits should have operated by a commission composing 
of both Soviet and Turkish representatives.96 
Soviet wish of revising Montreux Regime expressed by Stalin to Churchill at the Tehran 
Conference in 1943 on the pretext of Turkish unwillingness to take part in World War II 
against the Axis States: “If now there were no objections it was necessary to reexamine the 
regime of the Turkish Straits. A big country such as Russia found itself locked in the Black 
Sea, with no means of exit. The Straits regime was first regulated by the Sevres agreement [of 
1920], then the Lausanne agreement [of 1923], and finally the convention concluded in 
Montreux All this time the English wanted to strangle Russia and if now the English did not 
want to strangle Russia any more then it was necessary to alleviate the Straits regime”97 
Turkey was not the only country which was concerned with Soviet aggression, including on 
the issues of post-war Berlin and aggressive Soviet attitudes towards the Greek civil war 
prompted the US to develop more cautious strategies against the Soviet Union. Harry S. 
Truman -the president of US- made one of the most crucial speeches in the beginning of the 
cold war and announced his doctrine stipulating to provide financial aid for Turkey and 
Greece. Under the Truman Doctrine, countries which were threatened by militarist, 
authoritarian or other external powers would be supported by the US government. The 
Truman Doctrine mainly aimed to enhance the military power of Turkey to make it capable 
of confronting possible aggression from the Soviet Union.98   
Turkish foreign policy regardless of domestic policy changes aimed at intensifying relations 
with the US in the aftermath of World War II. With the foundation of NATO Ankara strived 
to be a member of the NATO. Despite, the US’s relatively positive attitude through Turkish 
entry into the NATO, Britain and other European states were relatively reluctant about the 
same issue. Turkey sought a way for entering the Atlantic Council and Turkish wishes of 
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taking part in the Korean War served this purpose. The telegram which was sent to the 
Secretary of State by Wadsworth – the US ambassador in Turkey indicated quotes of Bayar 
showing Turkish concerns over the emergent reluctance considering Turkey’s entry into the 
NATO: “Does your Government not realize that we Turks will consider further deferment of 
favorable action on our request by the Atlantic Pact powers as a refusal and as unwillingness 
to accept us as equal partners in meeting jointly any threat of aggression? We have shown 
our good faith by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, if 
Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our morale will be 
seriously affected. We are not a people readily influenced by propaganda. In this matter, 
however, there is widespread concern and uncertainty. We feel our very future is at stake.” 99 
In return of Turkish participation of Korean campaign, the US fully supported Turkish 
membership of the NATO. However, France and Britain abstained about Turkish 
membership of the NATO. In 1951, Morrison sent a letter to the Turkish government laying 
down a condition to support the membership of Turkey. Britain could support Turkish 
membership if Turkey guaranteed that it would act together with Britain, France and the US 
in case of any conflict coming to existence in the Middle East. As a result, Greece and 
Turkey joined the NATO and the CENTO was founded.100  
As a result of Turkish membership of NATO, Turkey has abandoned its non-belligerent and 
neutral foreign policy which was inherited from Ataturk’s term. Young Turkish Republic for 
the first time pledged to orient one side deeply. Even though Turkey relieved regarding its 
security concerns arising from Soviet threat over the straits and Kars and Erzurum provinces, 
NATO membership brought different outcomes to Turkish foreign policy apart from security. 
Firstly, it deeply changed the relations between West and Turkey and Ankara became more 
dependent on the West. Secondly, the good relations deriving from Bolshevik-Kemalist 
solidarity during Turkish Freedom War completely disappeared and Turkey turned into a 
front base of NATO due to its geopolitical importance sharing frontiers with the Soviet 
Union.  
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2.4 Turkish Foreign Policy Orientation during Cold War: 
2.4.1 Western-Oriented Years (1952-1974) 
Turkey’s geopolitical location, that spans two continents and two struggle zones of Cold War, 
was the primary reason to be enrolled in NATO. Associating with its geopolitical 
significance, Turkey became long-standing and active member of NATO and made a certain 
level of contribution through the defence of the Middle East and Europe in favour of the 
Western alliance.101  
The Turkish government regarded NATO membership as the only way of ensuring its 
territorial integrity against the Soviet Union. Turkey by locating herself in the Western bloc 
through NATO membership managed to diminish security concerns deriving from the Soviet 
Union that was considered threatening to Turkey’s security and newly developing democratic 
system. 
Speaking of international political conditions at the beginning of the cold war, the US came 
up as the super-power, by replacing Britain that weakened out of the World War II, and on 
the other hand Soviet Union referred to the opposite pole. The rivalry between the two super 
powers had already launched even in the World War II about serious issues such as 
administrating Berlin. In fact, sharp polarisation between the superpowers starting with 
Berlin spilled over in an international scale. Turkey could not isolate herself these 
developments, and it chose to orient in Western concert against the Soviet Union at the 
expense of abandoning its independent foreign policy concept and its newly developing 
national economy.       
Inside the NATO, Turkey undertook many delicate tasks against “Soviet expansionism”. 
First, Turkey by its membership of NATO made a great contribution to containment policy of 
the US during Cold War against the Soviet Union. Second, Turkey, besides having land 
frontiers, shared the Black Sea with Soviet Union, Turkey’s main strategic role was bottling 
up Soviet navy in the Black Sea.102 Third, Turkey by using ethnical ties could influence 
Turkic societies endeavoured to damage Soviet central authority to spill over.103  
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Turkish foreign policy with its membership of NATO radically changed. In fact, the Turkish 
foreign policy shift was based on the principle of reciprocity. In return of Western support 
diminishing Turkey’s security concerns stemming from the aggressive image of Soviet 
Union, Turkey located herself in the Atlantic system. Turkey played a pivotal role in the 
defence of the West from the Soviet Union, while the West made a contribution to 
modernising Turkish military equipment and facilities and the army.104  
However, Ankara with the membership of NATO immediately began to pursue and to 
instrument NATO policies by renouncing Ataturk’s foreign policy principle that not to 
interfere neighbours’ internal affairs. Moreover, Ataturk’s multi-dimensional foreign policy 
concept placing a particular significance on establishing regional solidarity was abandoned 
by entering NATO. Turkey regarded the interests of West as its national interests and it 
strived for getting more oriented in the Western concert.105 
Furthermore, Turkey’s deepening integration into Western concert led to a huge disturbance 
in the region. States which were gained their independence recently began to see Turkey as a 
threat to their independence. These newly independent states had become independent due to 
decreasing power of Britain and France aftermath of the World War II. Their priority was to 
preserve their independence against any external threats. When Turkey renounced its foreign 
policy framework giving precedence to regional relations based on a principal of mutual 
respect to others’ territorial integrity, most of the states in the region radically revised the 
attitudes on Turkish government.  
Bandung Conference (1955) was a significant event in the sense of demonstrating changing 
Turkish government’s perceptions on foreign policy issues. The participants of the 
conference mostly consisted of recently decolonised states and developing states. At the 
conference Turkish foreign minister, Fatih Rustu Zorlu used the platform criticising sharply 
non-alignment policy of the attendees by highlighting “communist threat”. Turkish 
representatives at the conference took a pro-Western stance against the idea of neutrality.106  
As of Turkey’s entry into NATO, Turkey began to pursue one-dimensional and Western-
oriented foreign policy. Besides that, the US perceptions over the USSR and other neighbour 
states of Turkey started to dominate Turkish foreign policy framework. Since Turkey entered 
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the NATO, Turkey and the US have signed reciprocal agreements including allowing the US 
to open military bases including the one in Incirlik, to use Turkish air space and to use 
Turkish harbours.  
New foreign policy aspired to supervise the interests of alliance states over the Middle East. 
Thus, Baghdad Pact (1955) was formed by Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. The Pact aimed at encircling periphery of the Soviet Union by anti-communist 
bloc and regenerating the UK activeness over the Middle East. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and 
Jordan did not join the pact. Turkey’s efforts to drag these states into anti-communist block 
cause deterioration relations between Turkey and these states which endeavour to pursue 
neural policy.107  
Turkey took a pro-Western stance on issues in the Middle East. When Israel together with the 
UK attacked to Suez Canal, Turkey stood by the action. However, as the attempt was carried 
out without the US, it was halted by American pressure and then Turkey barely condemned 
the action of the UK at the Baghdad Pact meeting which Britain did not attend.108  
Beside these, Turkey supported other actions of allies in Middle East. In 1958, in accordance 
with Eisenhower doctrine, Operation Blue Bat as the first application of Eisenhower doctrine 
was carried out by American marine troops with the support of Ankara by allowing the US to 
use Incirlik base. When Britain sent paratroops to Jordan, Turkey stood by this intervention. 
Moreover, with regards to Algerian War, Turkey took a stance favouring France in the UN.109  
A major transformation took place in the stance of Soviet administration through Turkey as 
of mid-1950. In the aftermath of Turkey’s neutrality in World War II, Soviet claims on 
Straits’ regime and on two Turkish provinces played a pivotal role to push Turkey to Western 
alliance eagerly. However, when Khrushchev came to power, discourses of Soviet Union 
through Turkey started to be softened. In December 1955, Khrushchev at the sessions of the 
Supreme Soviet stated that “It is known when Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inönu were as the top 
of the Turkish leadership we had very good relations but later on they deteriorated. We 
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cannot say that this happened only because of Turkey; there were inappropriate statement 
made on our side which weakened these relations.” 110 
The aftermath of World War II, Ankara strived to integrate its national economy to 
international market. Therefore, import substitution policy was replaced by open-market 
strategy. This strategy remained low-developed Turkish industry needy for foreign 
investments. When American economic support in the framework of Marshall Plan was 
halted, Turkish economy came to a standstill. Therefore, DP government sought to ways of 
providing economic assistance from the USSR. Before Prime Minister Menderes visit to 
Moscow, DP government was toppled down by a military intervention on 27 May 1961.111   
2.4.2 Relative Autonomy (1974-1978) 
By mid-1960s Turkey like Greece was very loyal to NATO policies. Yet, Cold War came 
into relatively détente period between the US and the Soviet Union as of the mid-1960s, the 
US relatively decreased its pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean.112 This new environment 
gave an opportunity to Ankara to reform its foreign policy concept by making American 
influence rare, in other words reforming it in along with its national interests more 
intensively, Post-War Turkish foreign policy formed according to NATO’s priorities, mostly 
under the conditions of strained relations between the Soviet Union and America and the 
threat of the Soviet Union as a regional aggressor. 
In the sense of being part of the Western alliance against Stalin’s threats, Turkey had enjoyed 
the advantages whenever the Straits regime was questioned by Stalin and when Soviet claims 
were made on Turkish provinces: Kars and Ardahan. However, its strategic orientation to the 
Atlantic system brought also substantial problems. First serious problems between Turkey 
and Western countries arose from opposite viewpoints over the Cyprus issue. When Turkish 
compatriots in Cyprus came under harassment, Turkish government planned to intervene in 
Cyprus even in the 1960s, but the US stood strongly against any Turkish actions in Cyprus. 
The US president Lyndon Baines Johnson letter to Inönu, dated 5 June 1963, threatened 
Turkey with halting on-going American financial assistance to prevent an intervention. In the 
letter also Johnson stated that in case of a Soviet aggression to Turkey, the NATO countries 
would not help Turkey: “Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could 
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lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO 
allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey 
against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without 
the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies...”113  
When Turkey saw that it could not carry out all national goals by resting on NATO and 
Western allies in the wake of Johnson’s letter, its extensive Western-oriented foreign policy 
framework was subject to criticism substantially for the first time at the official level.114 The 
developing democratic rights and enlarging freedoms under the favour of the 1961 
constitution played a pivotal role to emerge public opposition combining with decreasing 
international pressure on Turkey thanks to the relatively softening environment of Cold War 
in the 1960s. This democratic environment enabled Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) to get in 
Turkish Parliament for the first time. TIP was a political party objecting Turkey’s NATO 
membership fundamentally and defending moving away from the NATO. Especially, critical 
views in public towards pro-Western policies reached the peak with the 1968 movements. 
During this period, pro-Western orientation strongly defended by right-wing movements, 
including those of political Islamists.115 The emerging political divisions in the political 
spectrum in this era was substantial in the sense of further political developments on Turkish 
foreign policy orientation many current actors who have made substantial effects on 
determining Turkish foreign policy orientation emerged in this era.  
 In 1963, Fetullah Gulen showed up in Turkish politics for the first time as the founder of 
Erzurum Anti-Communist Association116. He will be further regarded the leader of a terrorist 
organisation. He and the linked association have been regarded as a champion of pro-Western 
political orientation in Turkey as they launched a campaign against socialists, Kemalists and 
nationalists basically who stood against pro-Western thinking in Turkey.  
In 1974, when Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus, the contradictions 
between Turkish national interests and the Western prospects came to ground for the first 
time since the end of the World War II. The US laid arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish 
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excessive Western-oriented foreign policy viewpoint subjected to discuss at the state level for 
the first time. Turkish cold-war foreign policy framework was drawn against a perception of 
Soviet threat and it was needed to be revised in accordance with Turkey’s non-overlapping 
interests in Cyprus. 
Turkey and Greece put their national interests ahead of NATO’s ones for the first time since 
they joined NATO and it led to an inevitable conflict between their compatriots in Cyprus 
and the conflict reached to the international level with the Turkish intervention. Besides the 
US failure to diminish tension between the two NATO allies, its relations with both sides 
deteriorated. While Greece left the military command of NATO, Turkey remained in order to 
monitor and maintain NATO’s activities, in case of any attitudes objecting to Turkey.  
The rising tension in the east Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece was undermining 
NATO’s containment policy targeting the Soviet Union. In addition to the frailty sprung in 
NATO with the departure of Greece from the military command, Turkish military strength 
was reduced due to the cut-of American aid by the Congress. Then, it is evident to say that in 
the wake of Cyprus crises, the US’s power in the Eastern Mediterranean weakened, while the 
US politicians saw boundaries of the American power on melting their allies’ national 
interests under the NATO security framework.117  
Following the Cyprus-related confrontation with the US, Turkey began to seek ways for 
diluting its tight dependencies on the West. In doing this, the Ecevit government launched a 
policy for developing relations with non-Western states including the member states of 
Warsaw Pact and Arab States.118 Moreover, Ecevit, in the wake of Cyprus intervention, 
asserted that Turkey had to completely revise its security concept indicating the 
contradictions with NATO and the US as Turkey could not trust the US anymore.119 His 
words would be regarded as the milestones for the direction of Turkish foreign policy: 
Cyprus question which began to come up as of 1960 had a great impact on changes in 
Turkish foreign policy concept. Oil crises that came up in the 1970s, rising public opposition 
objecting to pro-US foreign policy concept and eventually Cyprus crises stimulated the 
foreign policy revision. The government endeavoured to formulate a more neutral foreign 
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policy despite its NATO membership. When Turkey did not receive support from its allies on 
the Cyprus issue, unidirectional and Western-oriented foreign policy concept of Turkey 
adopted in the 1950s was to be replaced by a balanced and multi-directional one.  
In this context, Turkey took an attitude supporting Palestine in the Palestine-Israel conflict in 
contrast to its previous viewpoint, perceiving the issue through the lenses of Western states. 
In the fourth Arab-Israeli War, Turkey did not allow the US to deploy NATO bases in the 
south of Turkey, while Turkish airspace was opened to the Soviet Union who aided the 
Arabs. Moreover, in 1975, in response to the American arms embargo on Turkey, Turkey 
terminated mutual security treaties with the US and retrieved military bases assigned to the 
American military. Again despite NATO membership, Turkey sought to adopt a more 
balanced foreign policy between the US and the Soviet Union especially in the wake of the 
Cyprus intervention. In June 1978, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s Moscow visit, he stated 
that "the embargo certainly affects our thinking in many ways and encourages us to be more 
imaginative regarding solutions to our economic problems and to our defense problems."120  
Ankara’s new foreign policy concept was subjected to debate inside NATO and this caused 
the emergence of new crisis when Greece left the military command of the NATO. Turkey’s 
veto on the re-entry of Greece into the military command increased the tension between 
Turkey and the allies. With the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the US lost one of the closest 
allies in the region and at the same time, Ankara’s approach towards the Soviet Union was 
continuing. Simultaneously, Ankara sought for solutions to dilute its security dependencies 
on the Atlantic system.  
Besides the failure of the American efforts to diminish tension in the East, it would have been 
expected from European diplomacy to make a contribution towards to settle the issue. Both 
Turkey and Greece became the member of European Council in pursuit of World War II and 
European integration issue held a great prominence in their foreign policy frameworks. 
Nevertheless, the Western European diplomacy could not soften the tension deriving from the 
Cyprus disagreement.121  
To sum up, Turkey by uttering lessening influence of the US through a relatively softening 
Cold-War in the second half of the 1960s managed to form lesser dependent and strengthen 
other directions of its foreign policy including Warsaw Pact countries and the Third World 
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States. Ankara got a great success with the Cyprus intervention. Cyprus besides its 
geopolitical prominence for Turkey’s security, it also has become more prominent in time in 
terms of energy. Under favour of the Cyprus intervention, Turkey obtained the major 
authority in the Eastern Mediterranean and laid the foundations of the TRNC.  
2.4.3 Reconciliation (1978-1983) 
Strained relations between Turkey and the US started to be normalising, as of American arms 
embargo on Turkey being lifted in October 1978. In March 1980, the U.S.-Turkish Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed, and with the agreement, the convergence 
between Turkey and the US was boosted. There were two primary reasons for this 
rapprochement.  
First was Iran Humeyni Revolution. With the revolution, the diplomatic ties between the US 
and Iran completely halted. After, the revolution the US took more sensitive foreign policy 
attitudes on Turkey as a balancing actor not only against the Soviet Union but also Iran. Iran 
revolution played a great role rapprochement between Turkey and the US. In the wake of Iran 
Revolution in 1979, Turkey’s geopolitical location got more prominence for the US. Apart 
from Turkey, the US did not have any allies left in the region. 
The second was, with the September military coup that was mostly regarded as a pro-
American junta took a pro-American attitude and wiped out critics in the army, universities, 
the media and politics. While the US influence on Turkey was decreasing, since the Cyprus 
intervention in 1974 in general terms in conjunction with the international developments, the 
US-backed military coup took place in Turkey. Greece’s re-entry into the NATO’s military 
command was carried out with the Turkish junta’s support. The strong public opposition 
objecting to the Western-oriented foreign policy was completely overwhelmed by the 
putschists. Critical views over pro-American foreign policy framework were eliminated. As a 
result of the coup, political Islam stood out in Turkish politics by the elimination of other 
political actors by the putschists. The 1980 coup gave an impetus to empower political Islam 
in Turkey in this sense. In this respect the AKP –ruling party since 2001- represents political 
Islamic ideology, the coup d’état, therefore, is also very significant to comprehend the AKP 
era foreign policy attitudes.  
Moreover, Greece’s return to NATO military command took place with the admission of 
junta government. Turkey lost its prestige internationally. Kurdish issue because of junta’s 
stern policies turned into a terror problem and it internationalised with the migration of huge 
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numbers of Kurds to European countries. Turkey’s parliamentary tradition was hugely 
damaged and instead of parliament, presidents or prime ministers started to become more 
influential in terms of foreign policy making.  
2.4.4 Back to Western-Oriented Foreign Policy: (1983-1989) 
Turgut Ozal, who was the deputy prime minister of junta government, won the first elections 
after the military rule lasting 3 years. During Ozal era, Turkish government gave the biggest 
portion of its attention on deregulation of Turkish national economy. It was not a surprise as 
Ozal is regarded the champion of neoliberalism in Turkey in accordance with the economic 
framework of Thatcher and Reagan. Before the military coup d’état, he prepared a new 
economic framework for the Demirel government in 1979 so called “the 24 January 
Decisions” which was undermining the principle of the social state, mixed economy views 
and workers’ rights. The decisions stipulated mostly to open Turkey’s economy to the World 
and to make deregulations but the new economy policy came across huge public critics.  
At this point, Perincek argues that 24 January decisions and the coup d’état were two sides of 
the same coin and the new economic policy could come into force barely with the military 
rule which was actually a stick for imposing the new economic rule upon the Turkish 
society.122 Contradictorily, Ozal was often regarded as a hero for Turkish democracy; indeed 
he was the deputy minister of military rule. Turkish foreign policy making for the first time 
turned into a one-man show. Before Ozal era regarding the critical foreign policy issues, 
collective decision making and consultation had been followed to settle foreign policy 
strategies between presidents, military, foreign ministry, government and parliament. The 
centralisation of foreign policy authority made Ankara’s foreign policy more dependent on 
domestic political changes. The intensity of ideological thinking in terms of foreign policy 
making increased and this, in turn, made Turkish foreign policy to very sensitive to domestic 
government changes. 
Turkish foreign policy during this term was preoccupied with economic relation with its 
neighbours. In addition to that, because of Iran-Iraq war, Kurdish groups enhanced their 
power by exploiting an emergent lack of authority in the region. PKK and Kurdish question 
came up as a serious national security problem. Following years, PKK and the Kurdish issue 
played an extensive role in means of Turkey’s foreign policy directions. 
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Furthermore, the relations with oil-rich Gulf States boosted in these years, during cold-war 
Turkey did not give attention to relations with the Gulf States but with Ozal government, 
Turkey’s foreign policy acquire a new direction towards the Gulf States. The economy policy 
began to become the more significant determiner of Turkish foreign policy. 
By the 1970s, relations between Europe and Turkey were formed on mutual security and 
economic needs. Yet, due to several crises, the relations were deteriorated. Turkey’s 
intervention on Cyprus and the world oil crisis strained the relations. Following 1980, the 
military coup d’état brought relations to a halting point. Therefore, one of the main foreign 
policy concentrations of Ozal government was integrating Turkey into Europe. Through this 
direction, Turkey endeavoured to enter the European Economic Union (ECU) but its attempts 
did not come to end.  
2.5 Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy: 
2.5.1 New World Order 
World order refers to the outcome of power distribution in international relations among 
major states. Therefore, while examining when the new world order revealed, we should look 
into that when the major change took place in power distribution among major states. In 
contrast to the liberal view that pointed the Gulf War as the starting point of New World 
order, a major change took place with the decline of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe in 
the autumn of 1989. The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the power distribution 
among major powers fundamentally and the bipolar international system evaporated.123 
The shift from a bipolar international system to a unipolar one took place with the collapse of 
Soviet Union. The systemic change and emergence of American supremacy led to rising in 
liberal theories in international relations such as “the End of History”. The main argument 
was that the essence of the American domestic system, namely democracy, was going to 
dominate the world and the rest of ideological structures could not avoid being obsoleted. 
However, fundamental changes in the international system did not abolish geopolitical laws 
of international politics. Despite the boosted expectations over the new world order stemming 
from liberal values after the decline of Soviet Union, the continuity of geopolitical disputes 
was witnessed in international relations.  
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At this point, we should look into what the new world order brought for strategic orientation 
problem of nation states by putting aside ideological thought from the new world order 
phenomena. First of all, the dissolution of Eastern Bloc unpacked ethnical and religious 
confrontations which had been thought to be melted under socialist rule. Ethnic identities and 
religion came to the centre of international politics. Second, combining with globalisation 
phenomena in the new world order, national boundaries were destroyed by globalisation. 
Third, the alliances of the Cold War inevitably were begun to be questioned since they had 
formed against the opposite pole in the world. The continuation of the NATO’s expansion 
despite the absence of Soviet threat launched new discussions over the role of the NATO.  
Political globalisation refers to spread out democratic regimes and to develop international 
law and international organisations. As a matter of things, nation states could not have 
isolated themselves from strengthening globalisation. In the new international order, the main 
challenges became ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism for the nation states. The 
nation states faced up a threat of geographic disintegration through ethnic and religious 
conflicts. Therefore, it is clear to say that the ideological appearance of geopolitical disputes 
was replaced by the cultural ones.  
Furthermore, the claim of this new world order was to spread out democracy, human rights 
and free-market all over the world.124 While the new world order destroyed national 
boundaries, the central authority of countries was undermined and this led to the rising of 
terrorism mainly based on ethnical and religious identities. The function of NATO was 
settled especially after 9/11 as fighting against terrorism.  
2.5.2 Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy 
Turkey’s orientation into the Atlantic system was taken place under the conditions of the 
Cold War based on its security concerns. Turkey’s threat perception was so much influenced 
by fear of Soviet Union. But when the cold war ended with the decline of Eastern Bloc, 
Turkey needed to revise its foreign policy orientation through newly emergent geopolitical 
factors. 
Since Turkey is located in the centre of Middle Asia, the Balkans and Caucasus regions, it 
had a direct influence on geopolitical changes in these regions. In Middle Asia, as a result of 
the dissolution of Soviet Union, Turkey, through its ethnic ties, with newly independent states 
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sought ways of pursuing more active foreign policy strategies in the region. Speaking of 
Balkans, in the eve of dispatching Yugoslavia, Turkey started to intensify Ottoman motives 
in its foreign policy. Therefore, in pursuit of Cold War neo-Ottomanist and Turanist elements 
obtained more interest than ever before. 
Turkey had played a strategic role for the security of NATO and Europe during the Cold War 
in the sense of containment policy against the Soviet Union but when Soviet threat 
disappeared, Turkey’s role in the Atlantic system was subject to debate. The national interests 
of Turkey sharply diverged from Atlantic system and it became more visible as of the Gulf 
War. Iraqi territorial integrity turned into a target of Atlantic system with the American led 
intervention to Iraq. Although the preserving Iraqi territorial integrity held huge importance 
regarding Turkey’s territorial integrity through Kurdish question, Ankara supported the 
attempts of the US in Iraq threatening Iraq’s territorial integrity, especially in the Ozal era. 
Neo-Ottomanist dreams of Ozal government substituted for realist thinking and eventually, 
the Kurdish question was boosted by dreamy policies of Ankara.    
Furthermore, ethnical motives gained weight in Turkish foreign policy making. With the 
dissolution of Soviet Union, ethic identities were unveiled. This allowed Ankara for 
developing cultural and political ties with post-Soviet communities. Through common roots 
with Turkic communities, Turkey strived to play a big brother role over Turkic communities 
in post-Soviet space without taking into account its own strength. Moreover, Islamic elements 
gained intensity in Turkish foreign policy making to develop ties with other Islamic 
communities such as Chechens. Turkey’s policy through newly independent states in the 
Balkans was also influenced by cultural motives. Turkey through Islamic and Ottoman ties 
tried to form a sphere of interest over post-Yugoslavia communities. Therefore neo-
Ottomanist rhetoric turned into a predominant element in Turkish foreign policy making 
towards Balkans.125 
With the end of Ozal era, the relative return to relatively more realist approach was witnessed 
in Turkish foreign policy making. Turkey’s integration efforts to the EU continued in this 
term. The most outstanding developments in this term concerning Ankara’s efforts for entry 
into EU were Turkey’s entrance in European Customs Union in 1995 and signing Helsinki 
Declaration in 1999. The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions dated December 1999, shows the 
EU’s stance to Turkish accession process. While Turkey was asked to settle its disputes with 
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candidate or member countries, for Cyprus accession this precondition was not asked as it is 
stated in paragraph 9b:“The European Council underlines that a political settlement will 
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached 
by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be 
made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all 
relevant factors.”126 By signing the declaration, Turkey gained a candidate status but at the 
same time it admitted to settle its disputes including the Cyprus issue in the framework of EU 
accession.  
On the other hand, the bureaucracy and army gained weight in foreign policy decision 
making processes after Ozal era one-man show. In contrast to Ozal era foreign policy 
strategies towards Iraq, post-Ozal era Ankara pursued a more realistic and security oriented 
foreign policy. In this framework, Ankara carried out several cross-border operations in Iraq 
to eliminate PKK despite the Western countries’ negative reactions. By 2000s, the PKK as a 
military part of Kurdish issue had been wiped out by anti-terrorist campaign. 
Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric was diluted by more realistic foreign policy concept. Especially 
through the end of 1990s with the recurrence of Russia, Ankara comprehended new 
challenges in the post-Soviet space in more realistic way. Turkey while strived to pursue an 
active policy in Turkic countries, it at the same time faced up with the fact that Russia was 
the most powerful country in post-Soviet space. This led to revise its foreign policy strategies 
that were formed with the support of the US for the purpose of undermining Moscow’s 
authority in the post-Soviet space.  
2.5.3 AKP era: Western-Oriented Years (2002-2011) 
Since AKP came to power, Turkish foreign policy has had substantial changes in terms of 
methodology and a way of thinking. First of all, AKP foreign policy attitude can be defined 
as a continuation of Ozal term foreign policy thinking.127 The early years of AKP 
government, the Western-oriented policies were practiced in the framework of EU 
membership process and Greater Middle East Initiative. AKP sought to make Turkey the 
model country in the Greater Middle East by making a mixture of political Islam and 
democratic tradition. Besides these, foreign policy making with the lenses of values turned 
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back to Turkish foreign policy making in the form of neo-Ottomanism and moderate Islam. 
Red lines of Turkish foreign policy based on the geopolitical consideration have been 
stretched with ideological adventurism of AKP.  
To understand AKP term foreign policy, we should look into the American foreign policy 
towards Greater Middle East after the 9/11. Wright defines the scope of Greater Middle East 
22 Arab countries, plus Turkey, Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan.128 The US designed a pre-
emptive policy against terrorism and fundamentalist Islam; it is called Greater Middle East 
Initiative (GMEI).129 Wright states regarding the GMEI: "the most ambitious U.S. democracy 
effort since the end of the Cold War, encompasses a wide range of diplomatic, cultural and 
economic measures, according to a draft of the plan"130  
GMEI officially stipulates to democratise Islamic regimes in and to dilute fundamentalist 
thinking in the Greater Middle East. Turkey’s significance considering the GMEI is stated by 
former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:   "To win the war against terrorism, and, 
in so doing, to shape a more peaceful world, we must reach out to the hundreds of millions of 
moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world. We must speak to those people around the 
world who aspire to enjoy the blessings of freedom and free enterprise. Turkey offers a 
compelling demonstration that these values are compatible with modern society — that 
religious beliefs need not be sacrificed to build modern democratic institutions."131 
The meaning of AKP’s coming to power with huge US support gained more significance as 
AKP’s moderate Islamist identity.132 In the framework of the GMEI, Turkey under AKP rule 
tried to undertake a model country role in the region. At President Bush’s visit in 2004, he 
also highlighted Turkey’s democratic Islamic feature: "Turkey is a strong, secular 
democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of all free nations. Your country, with 
150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's 
bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe 
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and in the broader Middle East-and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and 
friendship of the United States"133  
At this point, the Strategic Deepness Concept of Davutoglu gains extra prominence since the 
theoretical framework of AKP foreign policy was drawn by Davutoglu. He suggests a more 
active foreign policy beyond Turkey’s geographical frontiers by uttering Ottoman legacy and 
common Islamic ties in the Greater Middle East. The aim of his concept is making Turkey a 
leader and model country in its geopolitical frontiers.134 In this sense, it is evident to say that 
the Strategic Deepness Concept is very compatible with GMEI. 
However, the Kemalist infrastructure of Turkey constituted an impediment to actualise this 
concept in Turkish foreign policy. The early years of AKP period, Kemalist principals of 
Turkey were undermined by AKP in order to adopt Turkey a model country for GMEI. The 
solid laicism associated with other Kemalist principles were seen as the biggest obstacles 
which are needed to be smoothed and to be brought in compliance with new foreign policy 
concept that was formed in accordance with GMEI. Turkey’s domestic political shift from 
laicism to moderate Islam under AKP government was carried out under this framework. 
Therefore, the shift cannot be defined as an issue of Strategic Orientation, the opposite way 
around that ideological shift refers to the efforts in order to adopt Turkey’s politics for new 
American strategies so-called GMEI. While AKP made efforts to dilute laicism at home for 
the purpose of making Turkey as a model country, it had to challenge with Turkey’s 
constitution. In 2008, the Constitutional Court announced a verdict that AKP became a focus 
of anti-laicist activities at the closure case of AKP but AKP barely got off from being closed 
down.135  
Neo-Ottomanism discussions came to the forefront in the literature in the framework of 
AKP’s foreign policy concept. Neo-Ottomanist discourse functioned effectively to cover up 
Turkey’s role in the GMEI. On the one hand, AKP has made use of vital foreign policy issues 
for propaganda at home, on the other hand, it endeavoured to actualise ”zero-problem foreign 
policy” mostly overlooking geopolitical facts. For the first time, Turkish foreign policy has 
become an issue of the domestic politics more than ever before. Neo-Ottomanism allowed 
making necessary transformations to adopt Turkey for a model country. And Gulenist 
organisation members were placed at critical positions instead of Kemalist officers in the 
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army through Ergenekon and Balyoz political cases targeting the Kemalist members of 
Turkish army as of 2008. 
The ideological thinking filled up AKP foreign policy conception; Ankara supported Muslim 
Brothers during the Arab Spring in the hope of establishment of ideologically close 
governments in the Greater Middle East. Muslim Brotherhood movement was inspired from 
AKP’s Turkey as a model to be turned into compatible with American aspiration after the 
9/11 towards the Greater Middle East that stipulated to put forward moderate Islamic 
movements against non-democratic regimes.136 As of the beginning of the protests against 
authoritarian leaders, AKP government has actively supported the protests. The Arab Spring, 
in general terms, was taken as an opportunity to open doors for Turkey’s geopolitical 
expansionism in the framework of Neo-Ottomanism by Ankara.137    
In Iraq, AKP government plays an active role developing an independent de facto Kurdistan 
by having interaction bypassing the central government of Iraq. Speaking of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
AKP went beyond the traditional red-lines of Turkish conventional stance that requires 
standing strictly against the foundation of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. AKP government 
pursued Western-oriented policies for a long time in Iraq and in Syria without taking into 
account possible results for Turkey in the dream of being the big brother for post-Ottoman 
countries. Regarding Syria, Ankara had a part in projecting Western-oriented policies by 
sponsoring activities of various opposition groups which were seeking to weaken the central 
authority of Syria.  
Considering PKK issue, Henri Barkey prepared a report in 2009 for Obama administration 
regarding the Kurdish issue. The report indicates several recommendations in order to solve 
the issue: the one regarding the PKK was that the US government should press Turkey for a 
peaceful solution with the PKK.138 Simultaneously, the breaking taboos of Turkish foreign 
policy came to prominent as a popular discourse of AKP government. The government policy 
towards the Kurdish issue was very far away from the traditional approach of Ankara’s 
approach to the Kurdish issue. With regards to PKK, AKP government launched a 
“democratic opening process”; the Oslo Talks were made between the government and PKK 
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aiming at settling the problem by negotiations.139 Of course, we still do not know if the US 
administration put the pressure of Ankara regarding the process yet still it is clear to say that 
“the democratic opening process” overlaps with American expectations from Ankara 
concerning PKK. AKP government policies till 2014 regarding the Kurdish issue referred to a 
breaking point from the traditional position of Turkey which was praised by the EU and the 
US.  
In Central Asia, AKP government continued Ozal era active foreign policy conception in 
accordance with Western countries. The emerged power gap led to a new struggle in the post-
Soviet region, Turkey became one of the most active states by trying to form good relations 
with post-Soviet states especially with Turkic states. These relations developed also during 
AKP term. For the West, Turkey’s presence in the post-Soviet areas is significant as this 
creates a balance against sphere of Russian influence and also it is breaking factor possible 
Iran’s impact on the region.140 Economic activities of Turkish companies have increased in 
the region during AKP era.  
On the pretext of breaking taboos of Turkish foreign policy, AKP opened up red-lines of 
Turkish foreign policy for discussion. In AKP era, Cyprus, Armenia, Kurdish and Aegean 
islands issues were approached in the framework of breaking the taboos of Turkish foreign 
policy. With regards to Cyprus issue, Ankara started negotiating the withdrawal of Turkish 
troops from the island for the first time in the hope of accessing the EU. Concerning 
Armenian issue, Turkey admitted to open frontiers at any expense. With regards to the 
Kurdish issue, due to “democratic opening process” Kurdish armed separatism rose from the 
grave and Turkey’s east and south frontiers surrounded by de facto Syrian Kurdistan and 
Iraqi de facto Kurdistan. Regarding Aegean Islands, 18 Turkish islands have been captured as 
of 2004.141 
2.5.4 AKP’s Partial Face Off with Geopolitical Facts 
Speaking of the PKK issue, AKP government abolished its ‘taboo breaking strategies’ and 
partially turned back to traditional realistic view of Turkey in time. The AKP gave up 
negotiating with the chiefs of PKK and launched a huge anti-terrorist campaign in July 
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2015.142 Against Syrian de facto Kurdistan, Ankara took serious measures by launching 
Euphrates Shield cross-border operation that is contradicting also the American policies 
regarding Syria and Kurds. The operation officially has two goals officially: the first one is 
wiping out the Kurdish corridor; the second is making contribution to fight against the ISIS in 
the framework of re-providing the unity of Syria. The primary goal of the operation has huge 
contradictions with the US policy in Syria as the US is making a deep cooperation with YPG 
that is regarded as PKK’s attached terrorist organisation by Turkey.  
Regarding the EU, President Erdogan and other Turkish officials have accused the EU 
several times of supporting and winking at PKK activities in the Europe. The several 
countries of the EU still host the PKK offices allegedly. Turkey position with the exception 
of the AKP’s détente period with the Kurdish armed group is solid towards the PKK taking 
the issue as a matter of its territorial integrity. 
Nevertheless, ideological attitudes of AKP government do not allow setting a strategy fully 
overlapping with Turkish national interests. With regards to Turkey, Syria issue is a part of 
Turkish territorial integrity problem. AKP government due to its ideological antagonism 
towards the Assad government and Iran cannot instrument a fully coherent strategy with 
Turkey’s main interests regarding Syria. As a result, it is evident to say that the insecure Syria 
turned out a vital threat to Turkey’s security. Moreover, alike what happened in Iraq out of 
the failed central authority, the Kurdish forces found a gap to develop their power, therefore 
disintegrated Syria refers to a great threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. None of the 
Turkey’s Western allies has same concerns to the same degree with Turkey over Syrian 
territorial integrity on the way around Syria, Iran and Iraq hold same concerns with Turkey 
thus Turkey to make its action coherent with its primary goal has to get rid of ideological 
attitudes on Syrian central government. 
Furthermore, the military coup d’état attempt and the status of Gulenist organisation strained 
relations between Turkey and the US. The leader of Gulenist organisation, Fetullah Gulen 
resides in the US and the CIA is accused of backing the coup attempt in Turkey. Ankara’s 
attempts to extradite Gulen and other members have remained inconclusive so far. Besides, 
the other conflicting issue has come to ground between Turkey and the EU over the Gulenist 
organisation and the military coup attempt in Turkey. After the coup attempt, a certain 
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number of army officers allegedly involved in the attempt fled to Greece and claimed asylum. 
Despite the Turkey’s official extradition requests from Greece, these requests have been 
rejected so far.   
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Chapter 3: The Crisis of Pro-Western Orientation 
3.1 Perennial Threats 
3.1.1 Cyprus Issue 
3.1.1.1 Geopolitical Significance of Cyprus 
Cyprus with its geopolitical location remains a centrepoint of long-standing disagreements 
between Turkey and the West. Cyprus is irreplaceable for any powers seeking to expand their 
influence in the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East and North Africa since it is strategically 
located between three geopolitically important regions. It is on the sea lane of the great 
maritime highway connecting the Mediterranean Sea through two sea gates–the Suez and Bab 
al-Mandab–with the Indian Ocean. From there, it links to two other sea gates. These are the 
Strait of Hormuz, leading to the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, connecting to the 
Pacific. Due to its geostrategic location, throughout its history, external powers have 
attempted to project their influence over the island.    
For Turkey, due to its association with Turkish compatriots living in Cyprus, the island holds 
significant geopolitical importance. Cyprus’s northern point is just 71 km from Turkey.143 
Cyprus was a part of the Ottoman Empire and from 1571 and this gave it geopolitical 
significance for centuries in the Mediterranean by means of controlling sea routes, trade and 
security. Out of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), the Ottomans had to rent out the island 
to Great Britain with the Cyprus Convention of June 4, 1878. Through the convention, Great 
Britain’s administration was recognised in return for the British promise of assistance against 
any possible Russian attacks on the Ottomans. At the outbreak of the First World War, the 
Ottoman Empire and Great Britain entered the First World War on opposite sides, causing the 
convention to be abrogated by Great Britain in November 1914. With the Lausanne Treaty in 
1923, Turkey recognised Great Britain’s annexation of Cyprus. The first major controversies 
arose between Turkey and its allies during Turkey’s intervention on Cyprus in 1974, creating 
the environment for future tensions.    
With regards to European energy security, Cyprus would become a major energy hub for the 
EU. Russia traditionally is the main supplier of the Western energy market and with the 
Ukraine crisis, Turkey promoted its geopolitical significance as a transit country. Moreover, 
Azerbaijani gas supply is also delivered to Europe via Turkey which in tandem with a project 
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underway in Israel to supply gas to Europe via Turkey gives Turkey a strategic edge on 
European energy security. Cyprus’s recently explored offshore resources have the potential to 
dilute European dependency on Russia. Moreover, Cyprus would replace Turkey’s role by 
turning into a transit country between newly explored energy resources including fields in the 
South Mediterranean, Israel, North Africa or the Middle East. 
Britain is another influential actor in Cyprus. Beside the 1960 Guarantee Treaties making 
Britain privileged together with Turkey and Greece, Great Britain has a military base on the 
island. With materialization of US superiority post-World War-II, Great Britain lost a 
majority of its hegemony over these strategic regions. However, its military base combined 
with a privileged status in Cyprus provides Britain an advantaged position to involve itself in 
strategic issues in the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. 
3.1.1.2 Collapse of London-Zurich Agreements 
In 1955, Greek Cypriot nationalists under the EOKA launched an emergency campaign 
against British rule through their desire to be part of Greece through “enosis”. In response, 
“taksim” was demanded by Turkish Cypriots to unify with Turkey.144 In 1960, in the wake of 
the London and Zurich Agreements, the United Kingdom recognised the independence of 
Cyprus and Republic of Cyprus was founded. During the same year the Treaty-of-Guarantee 
was signed by Turkey, Cyprus and Great Britain establishing the rights of guarantor states. 
Through the London-Zurich Agreements together with the Treaty of Guarantee, the 
constitution of Cyprus was drafted and came into force.145 Even though the draft fell short of 
Turkish and Greek demands, both Turkish and Greek communities gained certain privileges. 
Under favour of the agreement, Turkish Cypriots gained strong constitutional safeguards 
which were disproportionate to their numbers in the population. Article 129, stipulated that 
an army of two-thousand was required to be %60 Greek and %40 Turkish  While Greek 
resentments were based on asymmetric allocation, Turks wished for forming separate units. 
Dr. Kucuk - vice-president of Cyprus- vetoed the proposal. 146 
In 1963, Akritas Plan was formulated by the interior minister of Cyprus, Polycarpos 
Georgadjis. In this direction, Makarios proposed major amendments, one of his 13 
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amendments was to abandon the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President. The 
proposal aims at undermining Turks’ rights. Beside Turkish Cypriots, the government of 
Turkey opposed the proposal. As a result, a large number of Turkish officers resigned 
including Vice-President Kucuk, Turkish population began to move out from mixed 
populated provinces. Due to the attempts to impose the Makarios amendments upon Turks by 
force, the hopes for peace under the Republic of Cyprus mostly fell through.  With the 
Bloody Christmas in 1963, many Turks were murdered. On Christmas day Turkish jets taking 
off from the mainland flew low over Nicosia and the Turkish army units left their usual 
military posts and took up strategic positions in the Turkish villages of Orakeuy and Guenyeli 
north of the capital.147  
Fears of possible Turkish intervention in Cyprus pushed Makarios to agree with a Joint Truce 
Force composing of British, Turkish and Greek soldier set up under a British Major-General. 
Cease-fire lines also known as Green Lines were drawn in Lefkosa so as to set up a buffer 
zone between the Turkish and Greek population.148 Ankara sent a diplomatic note with 
highlighting its legitimate right of intervention in Cyprus on March 12, 1964149; and, on 
March 17, 1964, Turkey carried out a military exercise to warn the Greek Cypriot and Greek 
governments in the Mediterranean Sea.150 Since British forces did not manage to decrease the 
tension in the island, a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 
established operationally on March 27, 1964.  Just like British forces, UNFICYP remained 
ineffective to halt tension.151 In August 1964, Turkey launched a military action bombing 
Greek targets in the Mediterranean Sea.152  
The Cyprus issue became a turning point in American-Turkish relations, and in 1964 when 
Turkey’s intention to intervene militarily on Cyprus issue came to light; the Johnson letter 
came off as threatening to Turkey.153 Prime Minister Inonu’s replied to the letter was: “A new 
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world will be established, and Turkey will take part in that world”.154 With Johnson’s letter, 
Turkish government fully comprehended the impossibility of carrying out all objectives 
under the NATO umbrella, if they are not overlapping with American ones. Due to 
insufficient resources to carry out a military landing combined with the American threat, the 
Turkish government had to abandon or postpone its military landing decision. 
In 1967 a military coup d’état had taken place in Greece. In September 1973, Makarios was 
overthrown by a military coup which was sponsored by the junta government in Greece. 
Nikos Sampson came to power on 15 July 1974. Speaking of differences between Makarios 
and Sampson, there was no sharp difference over enosis idea, but the differences arose from 
the methodology. While Makarios was striving to carry out a union with Greece step by step, 
the junta sought to actualise enosis at once.155 
3.1.1.3 Turkey’s Intervention 
Turkish government assessed the coup d’etat as a part of enosis plan. Ankara had already 
become dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of international forces in the matter of halting 
military support from Greece to the Greek Cypriot government, therefore Turkey called 
international actors for taking effective measures to halt Greece’s military transfer to 
Cyprus.156 When the coup d’état took place in Cyprus, an opportunity for Turkey revealed to 
carry out a military intervention with minimised international reaction.157 In fact after the 
coup d’état including the US and Britain international actor estimated oncoming Turkish 
intervention, thus they strived to appease Turkey.158 The coup showed international actors 
that Turkish action may have had justification.159 Turkey launched a military action in Cyprus 
on 20 July 1974 on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee.160 The intervention laid the 
foundations of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). For the first time since 
NATO membership, Turkey set out a plan about its national interests independently of 
Western allies. 
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The Western allies of Turkey opposed Turkey’s intervention. The UN Security Council 
issued a resolution calling for immediate ceasefire and negotiations between the parties of the 
conflict.161  Turkey halted the military operation due to enhancing international pressure and 
attended Geneva talks together with Greece and Britain on July 25, 1974. The Geneva 
declaration dated July 30th was announced. According to the declaration, Turkey should stop 
military advancement and Turkish enclaves occupied by Greeks and Greek Cypriots should 
be evacuated, and the UNFICYP was charged with the defence of Turkish enclaves located 
outside of the areas occupied by Turkish Army.162 
The Second Geneva talks started on August 8, 1974. Turkey proposed a federation in Cyprus, 
but Greek party did not acknowledge Turkey’s proposal. Turkey’s growing suspicions of 
Greece’s possible military action arose from the observed mobility in the Aegean Sea 
between Greece and Cyprus, and this pushed Turkey to launch a second operation to preserve 
the emerging status-quo of its first intervention on August 14, 1974. Turkish troops secured 
Northern part of Cyprus by forming Magosa-Lefke line running east-west. This part refers to 
38 per cent of Cyprus.163 
3.1.1.4 Results of Turkey’s Intervention 
Makarios gave a speech before the Security Council on 19 July 1974 and he accused the junta 
government in Greece as the organiser of the coup d’etat in Cyprus. Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe Resolution 573 dated on July 29, 1974 indicated there was 
legitimacy for Turkey’s intervention.164 The Greek Supreme Court of Appeal in its decision 
no. 2658/79 dated 21.03.1974 underlines that Turkey exercised its legal right by intervening 
in Cyprus. The decision also stated that Greek generals and officers plotted a coup d’etat 
against Cyprus government on 15 July 1974. Moreover, the Court convicted them of 
organising a failed assassination on Makarios.165 
For American interests, the conflict was weakening NATO’s southern flank that held 
strategic importance to prevent a possible Soviet expansion.166 The Turkish intervention in 
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Cyprus harshly deteriorated the relations between West and Turkey. In 1974, the US began to 
impose an arms embargo on Turkey.167 By way of response, Ankara closed down all but one 
American base.168 Moreover, Turkey initiated a policy to establish closer relations with the 
Soviet Union, adapting its policy to the situation. Although before the military coup, the 
Soviet Union declared that it would back Cyprus territorial integrity in case of a foreign 
intervention. After the pro-American coup in Greece, the Soviet Union adopted a more 
neutral policy towards Cyprus. Turkey, due to a softening Soviet threat perception and in the 
aim of forming international support on the issue of Cyprus in the UN, sought ways of shift 
its foreign policy. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement boosted apprehensions in the West of 
losing Turkey to the other camp of the Cold War.169 
Combining with the Soviet-Turkey rapprochement, Iran revolution played a major role in 
easing US attitude towards Turkey because of the fears of losing Turkey to another camp 
after Iran. After the US embargo, Turkey came across a harsh economic crisis and turned to 
depend on American aids. Therefore, the appropriate ground for Turkish-Western 
reconciliation was formed and the US government lifted the embargo on Turkey in 1978.170  
In 1975, the foundation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed by 
President Rauf Denktas. The Turkish side consisting of Turkey and TFSC supported a 
federative solution based on self-governing Greek and Turkish parts but Greek side claimed 
itself as the only sovereign of Cyprus. The UN efforts for a solution in the island could not 
change the status quo established with Turkey’s military intervention. In response to the 
Greek Cypriot side ignoring the TFSC, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
was established as an independent state by a unanimous of vote at the TRNC Parliament in 
1983. Security Council declared that foundation of TRNC was a contravention of the 1960 
treaties and this would deteriorate the situation on island. The Security Council also called 
upon all states not to recognise the TRNC as a sovereign state.171    
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3.1.1.5 Negotiations  
Turkey and Greece have been confronting each other over the Cyprus issue. While Ankara 
favours inter-communal negotiations for the settlement of the issue, Greece has sought to 
internationalise the issue.172 On the other hand, the Turkish side favours a federative solution, 
which rests on equality between the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus. The other prominent 
demands by Turkish side are re-establishment of veto power for the vice-president as was the 
case in the 1960 Constitution, preserving certain numbers of Turkish troops and autonomy. 
Turkey focuses on preserving its existence in the island. Turkey has, traditionally regardless 
of government changes at home, has taken Cyprus issue as a national cause. Under favour of 
the status quo, Turkey gained a geopolitical supremacy in the Mediterranean and ensured its 
position to involve energy issue besides ensuring rights of Turkish Cypriots. 
However, through the UN efforts and the US involvement, the Turkish side had to admit to 
reduce territory, drop the idea of a rotating presidency and soften its demand for a solid veto. 
In 1985 at the UN talks, the Turkish side agreed to make concessions for the first time on 
territory and withdrawals of Turkish troops in return for constitutional guarantees pursuant to 
the UN draft agreement. While the Turkish side fully accepted the draft, the Greek side took 
the draft as a precondition for further negotiations. In response, Denktas remarked: ''I have 
made enough concessions… If everything is to be renegotiated, then I have to withdraw my 
concessions and start from square one.''173   
While Turkey and the West confronted each other directly, it had seemed as more of a 
problem between Greece and Turkey. With the Greek Cypriot accession to EU, it added 
another element to the issue which directly challenged Turkey. The most controversial issue 
in the membership process was that Brussels regarded the Greek Cyprus as a full member and 
as a representative of the whole island rather than as a portion. EU had not enlarged through 
problematic areas before the settlement.174 However, with the enrolment of Southern Cyprus, 
the EU has taken a position related to Cyprus favouring the Greek side and demanding from 
the Turkish side to make unilateral concessions.  
The Annan referendum in the sense of showing the Western solid attitude towards the TRNC 
was very important. The Annan Plan, with official support from the EU, stipulated a 
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federated solution in Cyprus composing of two constituent states. Here, the Greek Cypriot 
party stood against the re-unification with 75%, while on the other hand 3:4 ratio of Turkish 
Cypriot voters said ‘yes’.175 Paradoxically, just after the referendum, Greek Cyprus was 
enrolled in the EU as the single representative of the whole island. While the side making 
positive approaches for re-unification and a solution was penalised with isolations, the other 
side had an overwhelmingly negative attitude to re-unification under a federation was gifted 
with EU membership. Thus the question arises of whether EU’s efforts related to Cyprus 
issue serve to solve the problem, or European states are just pursuing their strategic interests 
regarding Cyprus dispute. 
3.1.1.6 Cyprus: Turkey-West Confrontation since 2004 
With the accession of Greek Cyprus into the EU, Turkey’s membership of the EU turned to 
impossible just as Helmut Kohl stated "if some people now are already promising 
membership knowing full well they will not have to keep their promises and that their nations 
will not approve accession in the end."176 With regards to the EU’s decision, claiming that the 
Greek Cypriot administration was representative of the entirety of Cyprus, this changed the 
balances in the East Mediterranean. Greek Cyprus under the shield of the EU, launched a 
more active energy policy, while most Greek Cyprus activities have proven to be pointed 
violations of TRNC’s and Turkey’s EEZ by Turkey and TRNC.177  
The EU’s interests on the Cyprus issue solidly conflicts with Turkish interests. The recent 
negotiations which are explicitly supported by the US and EU aim at settling the Cyprus issue 
in favour of Western interests. Turkey is asked to open its customs and airspace to Greek 
Cyprus unilaterally by the EU.178 Mustafa Akinci, since he was elected as the president of 
TRNC in 2015, has been supporting negotiations at any expense for the purpose of 
unification of Cyprus. At this point, for the first time since 1974, Turkey has stood alone on 
issues pertaining to the island nation.179 Turkey’s position in the region has been severely 
disadvantaged since the Greek Cypriots acceded to the EU in 2004. Turkey’s confrontation 
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with Europe on Cyprus got intensified in recent years. So far, the EU seeks to decrease 
Turkey’s power in the East Mediterranean and implements its policy by taking account into 
this goal. For instance, the EU imposed of withdrawal the troops from the TRNC remains as a 
perpetual condition for Turkish accession to the EU.    
The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is very rich in terms of offshore resources and these resources 
are very promising for major powers since they are still undeveloped. In this aspect, Cyprus’s 
significance combined with developments in North Africa and the Middle East was boosted 
with recent offshore energy explorations.180 The offshore energy capacity has allegedly 
upheld most of the EU’s energy needs for a long term. Therefore, the EU takes an active 
stance in the region through Greek Cyprus as a part of the energy policy.181 
Moreover, Greek Cyprus has made mutual agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Israel and Syria 
so far in order to determine its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). Under this agreement, it 
licenced the American Nobel Energy Company to drill natural gas in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Turkey objected Greek Cypriot actions declaring that their actions as a violation of 
International Law, and called for European leaders to take actions to abandon unilateral 
energy operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.182 But Turkey did not get any 
noteworthy contributions from the West on the issue. In return, Turkey sent its fleets by 
signing a bilateral contract with TRNC for energy exploration. 
3.1.2  Kurdish issue 
3.1.2.1 The Issue as an International Card 
The Kurdish issue is a hole of Turkish Foreign policy since the collapse of Ottoman Empire. 
The Sevres Treaty that was signed between the Ottoman and the Allied delegations stipulated 
to carve up Turkey in terms of religious and ethnic differences, including the Kurds. Under 
the conditions of occupation, the Turkish Independence War was launched so as to make the 
Treaty invalid by objecting Ottoman Sultan. The treaty also promised an independent 
Kurdistan spanning in the south-east of Turkey. Because of this background, the Kurdish 
issue in Turkey has been regarded as a matter of security, and more accurately, as a matter of 
territorial integrity.  
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Great Britain was the primary defender of the Sevres Treaty due to this projection. However, 
the Independence War of Turkey invalidated Sevres Treaty. Nevertheless, Kurdish issue 
through contradictive status of Mosul remained as the primary topic of Lausanne Conference. 
According to the Turkish National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), Mosul was intended to be a part of 
Turkey and the most agitating discussion took place on the Mosul issue during the Lausanne 
Conference. When the Mosul question between Turkey and Britain could not be solved in 
Lausanne, these two states agreed to bring the issue to the League of Nations. 
Simultaneously, an uprising sponsored by Britain was launched in the Southeast of Turkey. 
The uprising led to lapse in Turkey’s focus on the Mosul issue, through the southeast of 
Turkey.183 Even though the Ankara government managed to repress the British-funded 
uprising, Turkey had to abandon Mosul in accordance with the League of Nations decisions. 
The existence of separatist Kurdish groups enabled external interventions throughout the 
region. Graham Fuller defined the Kurdish separatist groups as a handy tool for external 
powers to weaken the authority of national governments.184 Speaking of Turkey also, Kurdish 
separatism has always been a trump against Turkey by any political actors who have an issue 
with Turkey. Therefore, the issue could be defined as a frailty of Turkish foreign policy in the 
international arena.  
Since armed Kurdish separatism was swept out by the Kemalist government in the early years 
of Turkish Republic, the external states had been devoid of this Kurdish card against Turkey 
for a long time until the PKK came to existence in the end of 1970s. Under conditions of the 
Cold War, the PKK was mostly sponsored by the Soviet Union and it was under the wing of 
Syrian government, on the other hand, the US supported Muslim Brotherhood via Turkey to 
overthrow Hafız Assad.185 Until 1991, the attitude of the West towards PKK was generally 
compatible with Ankara, because of Turkey’s irreplaceable geopolitical role for NATO and 
also since PKK actions were directed by Syria and the USSR targeting Turkey, Turkey 
needed to deepen its orientation in Western concert for its own security.  
3.1.2.2 The American Involvement 
The First Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort brought a new dimension to the issue. 
The UN Security Council issued a decision adopted April 5th, 1991 to use of force to protect 
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civilians from Iraqi central government’s violence.186 Even though the decision explicitly did 
not state, no-fly zone was announced by the US-led coalition on April 17th, 1991 in the north 
of the 36th parallel on the basis of the resolution on the pretext of securing humanitarian 
aids.187  
The PKK, before the security zone had been squeezed between Turkish and Iraq security 
forces. But with the foundation of the security zone, the PKK gained huge benefits. Northern 
Iraq became a safe haven for the PKK.188 A de-facto Kurdistan was gradually founded in 
Northern Iraq.189 The operation was launched by an international alliance led by the US with 
the involvement of Ankara in March 1991 so as to defend Kurdish political presence in 
Northern Iraq against Saddam, and with the operation, Turkey’s new role became as a 
protector of de-facto Kurdistan in Iraq.190 
Besides the PKK, Northern Iraq hosted other Kurdish elements. While Ankara set up limited 
cooperation with them due to the fear of an independent Kurdistan, in the 1990s both Barzani 
and Talabani declared support for an autonomous solution under the Iraqi central 
government. Moreover, they aimed at forming good relations with the neighbours, especially 
with Turkey. To do so, they seemed negative against PKK and Ocalan and they looked into 
enhancing economic ties with Turkey. The supply routes of Northern Iraq did not allow for a 
de facto Kurdistan, with the exception of forming trade relations with Turkey. The other 
reason was the US administration pressure on Iraqi Kurds to develop relations with Turkey. 
The former secretary of State James Baker allegedly laid down good relations with Turkey as 
a condition to maintain support from the US to Iraqi Kurds.191   
Moreover, with the establishment of the security zone, a number of PKK activities began to 
increase and expand. Turkey, in order to undermine the PKK’s existence in Northern Iraq, 
launched an extensive operation in October 1992 cooperating with Barzani’s forces 
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officially.192Neither the US nor European states had objected to the Turkey’s cross-border 
operation directly. There were two reasons for the silence; firstly, Turkey laid it as a 
condition in return of opening its territory to the coalition countries’ troops. Secondly, 
Turkey’s geopolitically privileged position left de facto Kurdistan dependent on Turkey for 
economic development as well as access to a viable market.193  
However, claims suggesting Turkey to make concessions on its unitary feature of constitution 
began to be heard more frequently. For instance, according to Fuller, Ankara had to allow at 
least the establishment of Kurdish autonomous state in southeast of Turkey to preserve its 
own territorial integrity. “At a minimum Turkey will need to establish some kind of federal 
system that permits the Kurds broad cultural autonomy.”194 
3.1.2.3 Kurdish Diaspora 
The issue between Turkey and the PKK in the Western eyes as of the First Gulf War started 
to become a democracy and human rights problem between Ankara and the Kurds. In Turkish 
public opinion, with the acceptance of the democratic aspect of the problem to a certain 
degree, the security dimension of the issue has been placed at the first rank.  
Kurdish diaspora played an extensive role to soften general Western attitudes towards the 
PKK. Many Kurdish people sought refuge in European countries when the 1980 military 
coup d’état in Turkey destroyed many democratic rights, and the Kurdish language was 
banned.195 This process boosted Kurdish radicalism, and it led to a bloody war.196 As a result, 
many Kurdish people, mostly Kurdish intelligentsia, migrated into European countries. It 
changed the characteristic of Kurdish diaspora from workers intensity to politicised people.  
Through the Kurdish diaspora residing in European countries, the Kurdish movement was 
able to construct good relationships with several European political organisations.  Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe founded the first Kurdish satellite TV channel (Med TV, and its 
successors).197 The Kurdish diaspora worked as an agent by building diplomatic relations 
                                                             
192 Keskin F. Turkey’s Trans-Border Operations in Northern Iraq: Before and after the Invasion of Iraq// 
Research Journal of Internatıonal Studıes – Issue 8  November, 2008. P.61  
URL:https://ais.ku.edu.tr/course/18873/OPTIONAL%20READING-%20cross-border%20operations.pdf 
(accessed: 15.02.2017) 
193 Hedges, op. cit. 
194 Fuller 1993, op. cit. p.113 
195 Eccarius-Kelly V. Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European 
Diaspora//Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002. P.91 
196 Ibid 91-95 
197 Gulsen V. Europeanization and Transformation of the Kurdish Movement//Leeds: UACES Annual 
Conference, 2015. pp:6-9 URL: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/gulsen.pdf (accessed:15.01.2016) 
65 
 
between the PKK leaders, and European authorities. Many effective organizations were 
founded by Kurdish diaspora in Europe such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project198, which 
has been very influential at EU institutions. There have been Kurdish parliamentarians in the 
European Union Parliament since the 1990s, and also the Kurdish National Congress199 
which is known as an active lobbyist in Europe since it was established in 1995.200    
3.1.2.4 PKK’s Strategic Orientation 
Turkey’s policy towards Kurdish issue during Ozal era underwent a substantial change. 
Turkey’s non-involvement principle on the overseas conflict was switched with active 
foreign policy. Ozal, from the outset of the Northern Iraq crisis, sought to overlap Turkish 
foreign policy with American interests. Turkey’s no-concession policy regarding the 
foundation of Kurdistan bordering on Turkey remained in the discourse.  
After the Ozal presidency, Turkish policy towards the Kurds turned to a more security 
oriented and more realistic one, and therefore Ankara sought to pursue cooperation to resolve 
the issue with other central governments which were discontented with the existence of a de 
facto Kurdistan. Turkey took de facto Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as a threat to its territorial 
integrity and carried out a policy by taking into account this acknowledgment. Therefore, 
post-Ozal term Ankara seemed to be more cooperative with Syria and Iran.201  
With regards to Turkey’s national interests, the re-unification of Iraq was the best option 
regardless of the leader or the domestic system. In this sense, any actions for weakening Iraqi 
Kurdistan from anybody were welcomed by Turkey. The fight between Barzani and Talabani 
was evaluated in this direction as a progress in the sense of undermining de facto autonomous 
state in Northern Iraq. Besides Ankara, other central governments also took advantage from 
the intra-fight in the de facto Kurdistan.202  
With Turkish cross-border operation that was launched in March 1995, Ankara spoiled 
American plans in Northern Iraq. Speaking of the Western reaction, there already existed 
dissatisfaction over Turkey’s policy regarding Northern Iraq which came to the surface when 
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calls were made by Western countries demanding the withdrawal of the Turkish army from 
Northern Iraq.203 204  
In parallel with this, rising American and Western activity in Northern Iraq, the PKK’s axis 
was shifted sharply, the organisation slipped from the hands of Syrian to American control. 
Nevertheless, since Ocalan resided in Syria, a wing close to Ocalan remained under Syria 
control while the other wing the one that referred to main strategic forces of PKK fell under 
American influence and direction. The reason why the reactions to Ankara’s Western-
oriented policies was objected firstly by the Turkish army was due to PKK-American 
convergence in Northern Iraq observed by Turkish officers. With regards to the extradition of 
Ocalan from Syria, Turkey and the US cooperated. He was transferred to Turkey by the CIA 
in February, 1999. With the operation, the US managed to abolish dicephaly in PKK 
administration. On the other hand, Turkey arrested wanted a terrorist leader in the hope of 
wiping out PKK completely. 205 
During the four years between the arrest of Ocalan and the second US intervention in Iraq 
launched in May 2003, many PKK members abandoned Turkey; many laid down their arms 
and surrendered to Turkey. Ocalan’s discourse radically shifted: he suggested a joint solution 
with Turkey on the issue by isolating the US from the Kurdish issue: "If given the 
opportunity, I am ready to serve Turkey."206  
3.1.2.5 Second Iraq War 
As of first American intervention, the number of PKK’s activities had increased, thus Ecevit 
government was reluctant to give support for the US in Iraq occupation. But in 2001, the 
AKP won the election and replaced the previous government. AKP government, during its 
early years, supported the US policies across the Middle East. Nevertheless, the 
memorandum dated March 1st, 2003 stipulating Turkish troops to fight together with the US 
army against Iraq, despite Erdogan’s major support for the draft, did not get through the 
Turkish Parliament.     
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The unexpected rejection of the memorandum strained the relations between Ankara and 
Washington. Despite the dominance of pro-American thinking towards the Iraq issue among 
government members, the Turkish Parliament did not allow the deployment of American 
soldiers in the southeast of Turkey. Kurdish Issue played a major role for this refutation. The 
tension arising from the rejection of the memorandum reached its peak in the aftermath of the 
hood event on July 3, 2003. Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq were captured by a joint 
ambush carried out by Kurdish peshmerga militants and the US Special Forces soldiers in 
Sulaimaniya on the pretext of preventing the assassination plotting by the Turkish officers. 
The hood event laid a basis of anti-Atlanticist view in the 21st century in Turkey.  
American second occupation in Iraq made a greater effect than the first one in terms of the 
Kurdish issue. The established geopolitical void with the First Gulf War was reinforced by 
the second one. Turkey’s control on Northern Iraq was greatly reduced. Turkey’s cross-
border operations against Kurdish secessionists were blocked by American existence in Iraq. 
PKK also in corresponding with the American intervention turned back to field. The militants 
came back to Turkey to resume the fight against Turkey. Ocalan’s discourse radically turned 
to a direction favouring American policies. PKK with the second American Intervention in 
Iraq oriented itself to pro-American policies. Ocalan and the PKK administration analysed 
that American policies that weaken central authorities and nation-states overlap with free 
Kurdistan goal. Thus, Iraqi Kurdish separatists and PKK came to the same point in terms of 
their perspectives on the US policies. The PKK took shape according to new conditions; it 
got rid of the ideological norms of the Cold War. A convergence took place de facto between 
the PKK and the US since the US recognised PKK as a terrorist organisation.207 
Speaking of the American policy shift in the region after the Cold War, America formed a 
strategy to dissolute nation-states in the region on the pretext of democratisation. 
Condoleezza Rice -former head of the US State Department,- explained the American 
projection for the Middle East, it stated that 22 countries’ borders would be changed in the 
region.208 On the one hand Turkey as a nation state stands against any secessionist policies; 
on the other hand, PKK itself is a secessionist organisation. Therefore geopolitical necessities 
for establishment of a Kurdistan left the PKK fully American control in Iraq and later on in 
Syria. The muted PKK terrorism in Turkey with the capture of Ocalan boosted aftermath of 
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the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. Turkey would not rise to challenge the US directly 
due to its deep integration in security and the economy with the West. Therefore it is evident 
to say that even policies for defending its territorial integrity became a confrontation point 
between the “two strategic allies.”  
Even though Turkey made limited cross-border operations in Iraq several times, none of them 
became as effective as the ones before the second American intervention. Turkey, because of 
identity-based concern of the AKP government and its heavy dependencies on the West, did 
not form cooperation adequately with other regional powers such as Iran and Syria against 
the increasingly autonomous region of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq.  
3.1.2.6 Syria and the Spreading Kurdish Corridor 
A similar process experienced in Syria, as of 2011, was when the authority of the Syrian 
central government has challenged with the mass opposition. During the period from 
Ocalan’s arrest to Arab spring, Ankara and Damascus had formed close relations. The Arab 
Spring became a turning point of well-going relations between Ankara and Damascus. 
Ankara’s perspective backing the Muslim Brotherhood with ideological concerns by ignoring 
geopolitical needs of Turkey cost Turkey in terms of its security regarding the PKK issue.  
Turkey from the beginning of the Syrian Civil War took a position together with Western 
countries seeking to overthrow Assad. The coalition supplied arms to opposition groups, 
trained them and provided huge economic aid. Turkey played a transit role in the process of 
passing armed groups to Syria so as to fight against the central government. The foreign 
militants were mostly consisted of Islamists but also sympathisers of Kurdish groups. In the 
early years of the conflict, Erdogan government sought ways of forming a dialogue with 
opposition groups including Kurdish and Islamist groups. For this purpose, the Erdogan 
government launched Oslo talks with PKK in 2009. 
Kurdish groups under favour of détente relations with Ankara expanded their powers in the 
southeast of Turkey, Northern Iraq and Syria. At this point, Ankara government contributed a 
policy undermining the territorial integrity of Syria, did not take a precaution to the 
modernising arsenal of Kurdish groups.209 Ankara’s short term indulgent policy overlooking 
expanding Kurdish power on its borders turned with an air operation targeting both PYD and 
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ISIS in Syria dated 22 July 2015. Turkish-Western alliance on Syria issue regarding Kurdish 
groups completely rifted as a result of the operation hitting Western-sponsored PYD in Syria.  
There are huge contradictions considering the status of PYD between Turkey and Western 
countries. While Turkey recognises the PYD as a wing of the PKK Western countries do not 
consider PYD a terrorist organisation.210 The other way around the Western public perceived 
PYD as a resistance army of Kurds. Certainly, PYD’s anti-ISIS fight contributed to forming 
this good image in Western countries. The US sees PYD as the closest and most effective ally 
in Syria against ISIS211; moreover, the relations are not limited with anti-ISIS campaign: the 
US since the beginning of the civil war has been supporting efforts for emerging de facto 
Kurdistan surrounding Turkey.  
The conflict between Turkey and the PYD has evolved into a point of contention between 
Turkey and the West inevitably. PYD controlled region is the home of American bases and in 
order to prevent a possible Turkish intervention on Kurdish zone in the Syria, these bases 
play a significant role. PYD has economic and military support from Western governments, 
with the leading support coming from the US. Speaking of Ankara’s position, Ankara 
recently remarked the convergence between Kurdish fighters and the Western government in 
Syria as the sponsoring of terrorism by the West.212  
3.1.3 Aegean Dispute 
3.1.3.1 The Dispute as a Geopolitical Confrontation Area 
The Aegean dispute is predominantly regarded as an issue between Turkey and Greece over 
territories located between Turkey and Greece. Despite undetermined sovereignty areas in the 
legal framework, the constant geopolitical facts lay down the basis of the dispute in such a 
way that whenever the Aegean Sea refers to sovereignty area of more than one power, the 
conflict becomes inevitable in contrast with terms which one state has ruled the Aegean Sea. 
The Aegean dispute firstly came up with the foundation of an independent Greece in 1832 or 
in the dissolution process of Ottoman Empire. The existence of two states in the Aegean Sea 
led to a long-run conflict. Turkey fought against Greece to liberate the Western part of 
                                                             
210 US Department of State Press Briefing by Mark C. Toner// US. Department of State, March 8, 2017. URL: 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/03/268295.htm (accessed: 15.03.2017) 
211 Ricciardone D. and Stein A. Mitigating US-Turkish Disagreement over the PYD// Atlantic Council, February 
24, 2016. URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mitigating-us-turkish-disagreement-over-the-
pyd (accessed: 15.03.2017) 
212 Erdogan says U.S.-led coalition gives support to terrorist groups in Syria// Reuters, Dec 27, 2016. URL: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idUSKBN14G1EU (accessed: 04.05.2017) 
70 
 
Turkey in its independence war. In the last century of Ottoman Empire, it lost its sovereignty 
over islands and islets to Greece and Italy. Turkish victory against the Western states in the 
Turkish-Independence War made it possible to revise the Aegean issues at the Lausanne 
Conference.  
In 1923, Lausanne Treaty was signed and Turkey was recognised internationally as an 
independent state for the first time. But at the same time, the Treaty determined the sovereign 
areas of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. It was during the Lausanne Conference that 
one of the harshest debates was made over the sovereignty issues of the Aegean Sea. With 
Great Britain’s supports for Greece, Athens generally managed to preserve its advantageous 
status which emerged with the dissolution of Ottoman Empire. Although Ankara was not 
fully satisfied with new status quo, Turkey also managed to compensate some losses made in 
the last term of Ottoman Empire. According to the Article 6, the islets which were three 
nautical miles far from the coast remained within frontiers of the coastal state. And also with 
the Article 14, Gökceada and Bozcaada (Imroz and Tenedos) remained with Turkey.213 
However, the Treaty does not have provisions for all islets in the Aegean Sea. Those islets 
and island which were not specifically given to any sides turned to the source of conflict 
between Turkey and Greece in time.  
The demilitarisation issue also has been a sticking point between Turkey and Greece. 
Speaking of the legal rights of Greece over the islands and islets, Ankara with the Lausanne 
Treaty admitted Greek islands on the condition of keeping the islands demilitarised since 
their position offers a direct threat for the sovereignty of Turkey. However, Greek party 
argues that the status of these islands since the Lausanne Treaty has been changed many 
times with international treaties and the mentioned article about the demilitarisation has 
become invalid. Beside these islands and islets remained with Greece with the Lausanne 
Treaty, the Twelve Islands (Dodecanese) remained with Greece with the 1947 Treaty of 
Peace signed between Italy and victorious states of WWII. The Article 14 of this treaty also 
decreed Greece to preserve them as demilitarised regions.214  
Through the Lausanne Treaty together with the Treaty of Peace, militarisation of islands and 
islets which are located very close to Turkey is forbidden, Greece allegedly has been 
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militarising these islands since the 1960s.215 According to Turkey, following the Cyprus 
crises in 1974, Athens has speeded up militarisation of these islands on the pretext of its self-
defence right. Turkey, as a response to the militarisation efforts of Athens, established its 
only unassigned army to NATO, namely the Aegean Army.216  
3.1.3.2 The Western Involvement to the Dispute  
The Aegean Sea is very important for European security in a sense that it locates between 
Anatolia and Europe. Today, regarding the migration crisis the EU strives to prevent migrants 
to pass Aegean Sea by making financial aid to Turkey for the purpose of keeping these 
migrants out of the EU, as Aegean Sea is regarded as a sort of boundary of the EU. In this 
sense, as a geopolitical reason of Turkey’s failure to participate to the EU gains prominence: 
if the EU embraced Turkey as a member state, this would be disposal of European security 
strategy. Moreover, as of the Greek entry into the EC in 1981, the EU’s activeness on the 
Aegean dispute has been increased gradually. Therefore taking the dispute as an issue only 
between Turkey and Greece would cause to degrade the Aegean dispute.  
Furthermore, major Western states object to the demilitarised status of these islands, on the 
other hand, Turkey insists on the preservation of the demilitarised status of the islands. The 
latest Western effort to invalidate the demilitarised status of the island was witnessed during 
the refugee crisis. NATO vessels have been patrolling in the Aegean Sea on the pretext of 
reinforcing Turkey’s, Greece’s and the EU’s security217 despite Turkey’s calls for halting 
NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea.218 Turkey sees NATO efforts in the Aegean Sea in 
accordance with Greece’s anticipations as attempts for de facto cancellation of the 
demilitarised status. Tsipras also states this discrepancy between Turkey and the NATO’s 
strategy. “Turkish demands are posing obstacles to a NATO mission in the Aegean Sea aimed 
at countering the smuggling of migrants and refugees into Europe…” 219 
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Before Greece’s entry into the EU, Western countries’ position towards the dispute was 
relatively neutral. However, since the EU membership of Greece, the dispute has turned to an 
internal issue of EU. For European security, the Aegean Sea is essential in a sense that it 
establishes and maintains EU frontier in south-east. While Turkey is regarded as an external 
component of European security strategy, with the membership of Greece the islands and 
islets turned into an internal security issue of EU.  
According to 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, every state is allowed 
to extend its territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles.220 While the Convention is advantageous 
for Greece, it clearly poses threats for Turkish sovereignty in the Aegean Sea on a large scale. 
Therefore, Ankara has not signed the Convention. But based on the Convention, the Greek 
government issued a bill stipulating to extend Greece’s territorial sea to 12 nautical miles in 
1995; in return, Turkey declared casus belli in case of actualising the bill for the Aegean Sea. 
Today, Greece territorial sea makes up 40% of the Aegean Sea. In case of application 12 
nautical miles territorial sea bill, Greece territorial waters rise to 70% of the Sea but Turkey’s 
territorial sea remains less than 10% of the Aegean Sea.221 Former Secretary of National 
Defence Ministry Umit Yalim claims that Greece already began to actualise the bill. 
According to him, 17 islands and 1 islet have been allegedly occupied by Greece since 
2004.222  
3.1.4 Gulen Organisation 
3.1.4.1 Network of the Organisation 
The existent opposite interests between the West and Turkey came to ground lastly in the 
context of the July 15th Military Coup d’état attempt. The coup d’état unfolded another 
discrepancy between Turkey and the West since the attempt mostly is regarded as a CIA-
linked by Ankara because of well-known ties between Gulen organisation and the US.223 The 
leader of the Gulen organisation, Fethullah Gulen has been living in the US in exile since 
1997 despite extradition demands by Turkey. Beside the US, the Europe is also seemed very 
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reluctant to extradite the Gulenist members who are supposed to be on trial regarding the 
2016 coup d’etat attempt.   
The first appearance of Gulen in Turkish politicas dates back to 1960s. Gulen was the 
founder of Anti-Communist Association in Erzurum in 1964.224 This is very meaningful, as 
the US supported some liberals or nationalists in other NATO countries, it supported political 
Islam as the antidote of Communism in the framework of American green belt project. 
Turkish Anti-Communist Association was founded under the World Anti-Communist League 
which was developed by the US.  
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union offered an opportunity to the US to spread its 
power over the former Soviet space. In this context, the Gulen organisation primarily aimed 
at attracting Turkic and Muslim population living in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, post-
Soviet space which is home of major Muslim or Turkic populations turned into a major 
influence area of the organisation. The Gulenist organisation opened many schools in post-
Soviet territory with the support of Turkish politicians, during the 1990s. Ankara’s will to 
form an area of influence over post-Soviet region caused Turkish governments to support 
Gulen movement, although these schools were mostly operated in English language and most 
of the teachers held American diplomatic passports.225 
The US strategy towards the post-Soviet region, aimed at putting ethnical and religious 
identities forward. The Gulen network was developed in the post-Soviet areas rapidly as a 
part of this strategy. Gulen organisation thanks to English-taught programs took attention of 
upper classes. Gulen schools aimed at bringing up pro-American students for the purpose of 
filling strategic positions in these countries’ administrations. Therefore, Russia under Putin 
administration started to take measures against spreading Gulenist network as of dissolution 
of Soviet Union. In 2004, many Gulen-linked schools were closed down all over Russia. 
Besides that, Gulen-linked business transactions were stopped by the government and those 
businessmen linked with Gulen were deported. The Gulen-linked activities in Russia had also 
intensified in Turkic-languages spoken areas. On December 17, 2002, the head of FSB stated 
espionage activities of the teachers working in Gulen schools.226 
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3.1.4.2 Gulen and the GMEI: 
For the first time, Gulen organisation was mentioned as a threat with its international links 
extensively at the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) report dated 17 
December 1996. The report warned the government against the Gulen organisation. It also 
indicated some sources of Gulen Organisation had acquired extraordinary financial power 
including through its money laundering network. Moreover, The National Security Council 
decisions, dated 28 February 1997, is also regarded a military memorandum, indicated Gulen 
Organisation as a threat to Kemalist principles of Turkey by showing its developing 
settlement intrastate. Due to the rising awareness about Gulen settlement composed of the 
MIT report and enhancing military influence on politics, Fetullah Gulen had to flee to the US 
in March 1999. Gulen was sued on August 31, 2001 for being head of the terrorist 
organisation that he established for the purpose of demolishing the secular state. Gulen 
applied for a Green Card in 2002 and claimed it in 2008. The interesting issue in the process 
of claiming Green Card was that his 29 guarantors consisted of well-known statesmen and 
businessmen including American diplomat Morton Abramowitz, and ex-CIA officers George 
Fidas and Graham Fuller.227  
However, when AKP came to power in 2001, Gulenist organisation was the major ally of 
AKP. The Gulen Organisation functioned to design Turkish politics and the Army in 
accordance with the model country strategy in the framework of the GMEI. Regarding the 
GMEI, Turkey was too secular to be a model country for the others, therefore Turkey’s 
Kemalist principles had to be blunt. Gulen organisation had already reached bureaucratic 
power intrastate. "Our friends, who have positions in legislative and administrative bodies, 
should learn its details and be vigilant all the time so they can transform it and be more 
fruitful on behalf of Islam in order to carry out a nationwide restoration."228 Ergenekon and 
Balyoz cases were launched on the pretext of plotting a coup d’état and facing up with 
Turkish deep state-mafia relations by Gulenist prosecutors and police chefs. The plot cases 
mainly objected at Kemalist officers in the army, journalists, scholars and politicians standing 
against moderate Islamic transformations. When AKP rose to power, the discharge of 
detected Gulenist sympathisers by the National Security Council began to be hindered by the 
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AKP. Indeed, until the relations between Gulen Organisation and Erdogan turned sour, 
nobody from the Army was discharged of being a sympathiser of Gulen organisation. 
The positive attitude of the AKP government to the Gulen Organisation began to change as of 
2012. Gulen-linked prosecutors summoned Hakan Fidan -the head of MIT- for testimony as a 
suspect of KCK operations. When Fidan refuses to give testimony, the prosecutor issued a 
warrant for Fidan’s arrest. In response, the AKP introduced a bill preventing the prosecution 
of MİT personals without confirmation of Prime Minister.229 The MİT crisis is regarded the 
first confrontation between Gulen Organisation and the AKP government. The fight between 
Gulen Organisation and Erdogan was deepened in December 2013 with the operations taken 
out by Gulenist prosecutors and polices accusing Prime Minister Erdogan, then several 
ministers, Erdogan-linked businessmen and Erdogan’s family of corruption. In the wake of 
the operations, three ministers of the AKP government had to resign. As of 2012, AKP 
government has taken serious measures against the Gulen Organisation. Gulen-linked 
schools, companies, media outlets and so on have been closed down in Turkey.  
As a result of the breakdown of the coalition between Gulen and Erdogan, Ergenekon and 
Balyoz prisoners have been released as of 2014 and the plot cases collapsed. Thus, Gulen 
Organisation was described as a ‘parallel state’ due to the extensive power within state it has 
held. The prosecutions were launched against the Gulen members for the purpose of wiping 
out the Gulen Organisation. Those operations undermining Gulen’s intrastate power were 
supported by the opposition despite some critics objecting to how these operations were 
undertaken. However, its cloak-and-dagger strategy let them remain powerful within the 
state. 
3.1.4.3 Outcomes of the Mutiny on Turkish Foreign Policy Direction: 
In the aftermath of the coup d'état attempt, anti-Americanism has enhanced due to 
widespread suspicion over American support for the putschists. The status of the American 
Incirlik military base has been subjected to dispute based on claims that the US helped 
putschists by using the Incirlik base, that has prompted Turkish security forces to surround 
the Incirlik base the day after the coup d’état. Beside this, ex-Pentagon officer’s article dated 
24 March 2016 encouraging and predicting the coup d’etat reinforced the claims of American 
involvement to the mutiny.  “So if the Turkish military moves to oust Erdogan and place his 
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inner circle behind bars, could they get away with it? ... In the realm of analysis rather than 
advocacy, the answer is yes. At this point in election season, it is doubtful that the Obama 
administration would do more than castigate any coup leaders, especially if they immediately 
laid out a clear path to the restoration of democracy.” 230 231 
The alleged Gulenist, who managed to flee from Turkey’s trial, preferred to seek asylum in 
Western countries. Many officers on duty abroad also called to testify as suspects of being 
members of Gulen Organisation have also applied for asylum in Western countries. The 
campaign against Gulenists turned into a national case, and thus it has been supported by 
various political groups from different parts of the political spectrum. President Erdogan 
defined the campaign as the second war of independence.232 Among Western countries, 
prevalent view on the coup d’état is that it was plotted by Erdogan to solidify his power to 
gain full authority. Therefore, neither Gulenist asylums in America nor the ones in the EU 
countries have been extradited to Turkey.  
With regards to Gulen Organisation, considering it as a domestic challenge for Turkey is not 
true. Its activities concentrate on many countries worldwide, but apart from Turkey two 
regions have critical importance for the Organisation: first is Muslim populated areas in 
Russia and second is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China. Common features of 
these two regions are that both host major Turkic-Muslim populations. In this sense, Fuller’s 
statement in 1999 is remarkable: “The policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping 
them against our adversaries worked marvelously well in Afghanistan against the Russians. 
The same doctrines can still be used to destabilize what remains of Russian power, and 
especially to counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia.” 233 Russia began to close down 
Gulen-linked schools from the early 2000s, while on the other hand, China also for a long 
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time struggled with Gulen-linked World Uighur Congress, in this framework, WUC’s leader 
Rebiya Kadeer is considered a terrorist organisation in China.234 235 236 
The Gulen Organisation in the most of the post-Soviet countries lost a substantial level of its 
power especially in the Turkic ones while it managed to preserve its presence in Western 
countries. Turkic countries had been regarded even up to the recent years as countries 
wherein Gulen Organisation was the most powerful more than anywhere else in the world. 
Moreover, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) declared Gulen Organisation a terrorist organisation in October.237 Beside the OIC 
and the GCC, various countries where Gulen Organisation was powerful at one time 
including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria closed down or nationalised Gulen-linked 
schools in consequence of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in the wake of the failed coup d’état.    
3.2 Insight for Balancing Strategies 
In previous part of this chapter, strategic and geopolitical threats were analysed to detect 
source of threats which cannot be balanced by Turkey’s national capacities. Therefore these 
threats are called threats pushing strategic orientation. In order to make an alliance 
sustainable for a state, the state is supposed to meet its vital interests to a certain degree under 
favour of being part of the alliance. With regards to Turkey’s strategic interests, preservation 
of its territorial integrity is the primary task. Turkey located itself in Western alliance against 
external threats expected from the Soviet Union. Speaking of Turkey’s integration to the 
West, since the outbreak of Cyprus dispute, Turkey has come across with boundaries of being 
part of the Atlantic system. Moreover, the Kurdish issue and Gulen Organisations have 
evolved into such great threats that Turkey, regardless of ruling parties, cannot avoid 
engagement in the context of surveillance of the state. For example, the Gulen Organisation 
from 2010s on had been regarded the biggest partner of the AKP government, but the same 
government had to launch a large campaign against the Gulen Organisation. For Turkey, 
changing alliance formations are possible today to balance the above mentioned threats.  
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With regards to Aegean and Cyprus disputes, Turkey’s rival is the EU. TRNC is regarded as 
EU territory that is not under authority of the EU for now. In other words, from the viewpoint 
of the EU, Turkey is regarded as occupant in the EU territory. Speaking of Aegean dispute, 
the EU perspective is similar. Therefore, Turkey’s official EU membership goal is not 
realistic and even if it was plausible, Turkish accession to EU is itself an external threat. 
Turkey needs to balance the threats originating from the EU by joining with other states 
which holding similar concerns with regards to the EU expansion strategies. At this point, 
Russia’s concerns regarding the EU expansion come into prominence regardless of Russia’s 
relations with Greek Cypriot and Greece. Although Russia has strong relations with them, 
these relations as long as they are members of EU are not likely to expand on a strategic 
level. Also from the perspective of Turkish interests, the threat which cannot be balanced by 
Turkish national capacities is EU, not the Greek Cypriots or Greece. Moreover, Turkey is not 
an EU member and also it is a sufferer from the EU expansion strategies just like Russia, thus 
developing cooperation against a common threat between Turkey and Russia will be a 
strategic response to EU expansion strategies. In addition, Turkey’s NATO membership is an 
advantage concerning its veto power of the perception that Turkey can pursue a disincentive 
policy in case of any NATO-related actions including membership of Greek Cypriots to 
NATO.238 
Furthermore, another major source of conflict between Turkey and the West is Kurdish issue. 
Turkey today is surrounded by a Kurdish corridor that is backed by the West. Regardless of 
identity-based adventurist policies of Ankara governments time to time, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
concern Turkish territorial integrity directly. Regarding PKK or PYD, the threat that cannot 
be balanced by Turkey is based on the Western support of Kurdish groups and geopolitical 
voids that emerged out of undermining policies objecting to central governments’ authority. 
Therefore, Turkey needs to form cooperation with central governments that hold similar 
concerns with Turkey namely Iran, Iraq and Syria and as a precondition of this strategy; 
Ankara should abandon its identity-based policies such as supporting Free Syrian Army, 
Northern Iraqi Kurdistan or other Sunni groups in Syria and in Iraq since they undermine 
territorial integrity of central governments. And also Turkey needs to form strategies for the 
purpose of hindering Western involvement in regional issues. The Astana Talks together with 
Russia and Iran is a positive attempt in this direction. Although strategic alliance together 
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with Russia against PKK or PYD is not possible for now, Western states’ influence in the 
region concerns both countries. Therefore, the appropriate infrastructure exists for a strategic 
cooperation between Turkey and Russia for the purpose of isolating Western states from 
regional issues. Decreasing Western involvement will inevitably undermine Western support 
to PKK. Moreover, China’s strategy concerning PKK is still unknown but in terms of 
balancing Western influence in the region, Turkey may develop relations with China so as to 
decrease its dependencies to the West.  
Speaking of Gulen Organisation, Turkey is not the only target of the Gulenist network. 
Russia began to close down Gulenist schools in the beginning of the 2000s on the other hand 
WUC’s Gulen-linked leader Rebiya Kadeer a proponent of separation for the Xinjiang 
Uighur Region in China, is considered a terrorist by China.239 Analysing the capabilities of 
Gulen Organisation without its deep ties with the US is meaningless; therefore Turkey needs 
to cooperate with Russia and China to struggle with Gulen’s international network. In this 
direction, a positive outcome of the failed coup d’état for Turkey has come through the rapid 
reconciliation between Turkey and Russia. Although it is not precise what level of help 
Moscow made towards preventing the coup d’état, Russia’s warning to Turkish government 
members about the oncoming coup d’état via Aleksandr Dugin has been verified both by 
Turkish government and Dugin.240 In contrast to Western states, Moscow’s stance concerning 
Gulen Organisation is overlapping with Turkey’s.  
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Conclusion 
This study aims to fill the gap in literature on the strategic aspects of Turkish foreign policy 
orientation. Most literature, devoted to the Turkish foreign policy redirection problem, have 
analysed the problem by putting ideological transformations in Turkey’s forefront. Debates 
on Turkey’s departure from the Western world have continued since the AKP’s electoral 
victory in 2002; however, they mostly fall short of demonstrating strategic aspects of the 
issue. Therefore, this research attempted to address the following question: “What are the 
strategic drivers of Turkish orientation moving Turkey away from the West?”  
In contrast to most literature, ideologies have a very limited effect on strategic level 
reorientation efforts of states. The effect of ideologies is limited with that democratic states 
since they have strong check-and-balance mechanisms are prone to carefully develop their 
strategies by avoiding adventurist attitudes. Regarding states’ behaviours, states make 
changes on their foreign policy strategies continuously but a volume of this change is 
proportional to a level of external threat. Changes at a high volume are subject to strategic 
orientation concept. The primary factors which direct states to alter their foreign policy 
directions are composed of security concerns. States are stimulated to formulate alliance 
formations mainly for the purpose of balancing external threats. In order to determine 
external threats, foreign policy makers put to the forefront two types of concern in general 
terms: geopolitical and identity-based. States turn to be more inclined to embrace geopolitical 
thinking as a level of perceived external threat increases. On the other hand, ideological 
concerns of foreign policy makers stimulate states to pursue adventurist and unrealistic 
policies mostly. 
In Ataturk era, Turkey and Russia despite the ideological differences formed an alliance to 
balance common threat perceptions. Ankara government during the Turkish Independence 
War beside received economic supports from Soviet Russia also formed a strategic alliance 
with Soviet Russia to secure the Eastern part of Turkey. In addition, Turkey and Soviet 
Russia formed a strategic alliance to overthrow the British-backed government in Caucasus. 
Turkey played an extensive role especially in the Sovietisation process of Azerbaijan. On the 
other hand, with the Sovietisation of Armenia, threatening situations disappeared in the 
eastern part of Turkey so that Turkish troops were directed to the parts of Turkey which 
under occupation of Western states.  
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Turkey’s orientation to Western alliance is also directly related with the external threat 
perceptions of Ankara. When Soviet Russia turned to external threats for Ankara government, 
Ankara had to abandon its neutral foreign policy to balance Soviet threat by taking part in 
NATO. Especially in Stalin era, Soviet demands from Turkey asking changes about the status 
of Turkish straits and Stalin’s threats Turkey with occupying its Eastern provinces drove 
Turkey to Western alliance.  
However, the first discrepancies boomed between Turkey and the West, when Turkey 
comprehended boundaries of as being part of Western alliance within the Cyprus dispute. In 
1974, when Turkey carried out a military intervention to Cyprus, Turkey’s relations with the 
West worsened sharply. The US imposed embargo on Turkey. Turkey strived to develop its 
relations with Soviet Russia to decrease the intensity of its orientation to the West. Western 
fears of Turkey’s possible move to another camp, weakening NATO’s southern flank and 
undermining Western influence in the region together with Iran Islamic Revolution led the 
West to fix relations with Turkey.  
Speaking of Ozal era, identity-based thinking dominated Turkish foreign policy making 
process to a major extent for the first time. In this context, neo-Ottomanist and Islamic 
elements came into prominence and they pushed Turkey’s traditional red-lines about its 
security to the background. As a result of adventurist perceptions, Ankara sponsored attempts 
undermining central authority of Iraq and willingly or unwillingly contributed establishment 
of de facto Kurdistan in Iraq. After Ozal era, Turkey relatively strived to readopt realist 
thinking in foreign policy making. The most remarkable issues in this term were escalating 
confrontations with Greece over Aegean Islands and the EU accession process. Turkey by 
signing Helsinki Declaration turned Cyprus and Aegean disputes to the matters of its 
accession process.  
Furthermore, AKP is the successor of Ozal’s foreign policy thinking in terms of high 
intensity of ideological perceptions of foreign policy issues in this term. In AKP era just like 
Ozal term, neo-Ottomanist and Islamic elements came into prominence in Turkish foreign 
policy again. But in contrast to most literature marking these elements as the beginning point 
of Turkey’s disengagement from West, the prominence of neo-Ottomanism stemmed from 
Turkey’s model country role undertaken in accordance with GMEI. Rather than ideological 
controversies, the disputes between Turkey and the West were arisen from strategic sticking 
points regardless of ideological attitudes of AKP. There are two events straining Turkish-
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American relation in the 2000s. The first one is that Memorandum of March 1st, 2003 
stipulating deployment of American troops in Turkey was refused by Turkish Parliament 
despite the AKP’s support. Another one is the hood event: Turkish officers were captured by 
a joint operation of American Special Forces and Kurdistan Peshmerga. Indeed, AKP’s 
partial face off with strategic challenges of Turkey began with Gulen-AKP conflict in 2013 
and the collapse of solution process with Kurdish forces. In this context, AKP began to take a 
cautious stance against the West.    
The major external threats that Turkey faces today originated from a failure of Turkey’s 
strategic orientation, particularly in the wake of the Cold War. The major reason of this 
failure is that ideological thinking has been replaced by the geopolitical one in the foreign 
policy decision making process especially when analysing events from the Ozal presidency 
onward. The dominance of ideological thinking led to two major outcomes in Turkish 
politics: the failure of predicting external threats, and the rising tendency of using major 
external issues in domestic politics. Since orientation strategies are founded for the purpose 
of balancing external threats primarily, the mispredictions of sources or volumes of threats 
have hindered Turkey from forming alliances in order to balance external threats to certain 
degrees. Therefore, embracing geopolitical thinking is sine qua non of predicting external 
threats correctly. Today, as a result of Turkish poor alliance formations, the four areas of 
strategic threats that are to be balanced through alliance formation; sources of these threats 
are the Cyprus dispute, Kurdish issue, Aegean Sea disputes, and Gulen Organisation.  
Speaking of the Cyprus dispute, it is mostly considered a long-run challenge between Greece 
and Turkey in Mediterranean Sea. However, the dispute in time went beyond its traditional 
meaning. The expansion of the EU through Cyprus itself has turned out Turkey to be weaker 
side in the Cyprus dispute and the meaning of EU’s de facto enlargement to Northern Cyprus 
would be the decline of Turkish power in the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, while forming a 
strategy in order to balance threats concerning Cyprus, Ankara today has to consider the EU 
as the main opponent. Turkey firstly has to form a strategy aiming to excluding the EU from 
the dispute in order to balance threats. At this point, Turkey is not the only country holding 
concerns on the EU enlargement. Regardless of Russia’s attitude specifically towards single 
European countries such as Greece or Greek Cyprus, Turkey may seek ways of developing 
cooperation with Russia on the bases of opposing the European enlargement. Russia, just like 
Turkey, as it was witnessed in Ukraine crises, opposed to the EU enlargement policies. 
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With regards to Kurdish issues, in the aftermath of Cold War, PKK itself carried out a 
reorientation process. While it was sponsored by Syria and the USSR in the conditions of the 
Cold War, it slightly turned to the West with the First Gulf War. Under favour of Western 
states’ general favouring position on Kurdish groups, the PKK has increased its power in the 
region and a Kurdish corridor that surrounding Turkey established. As like Turkey, other 
central governments have similar concerns. The possible foundation of Kurdistan sponsored 
by the US will inevitably have effects on Iran’s territorial integrity as much as Turkey’s, 
Iraq’s and Syria’s. Therefore, Turkey needs to pursue strategies for the purpose of reinforcing 
the power of central authorities in the region since their territorial integrity directly concerns 
Turkish security. At this point, Turkey’s support for Free Syrian Army in Syria as it serves to 
weaken Syrian central authority does not overlap with Turkey’s long-term geopolitical 
interests. Beside an alliance with regional states against the PKK, the US involvement in the 
regional issues strengthens the Kurdish corridor, as it is primarily supported by the US. 
Therefore, the isolation of the US from the regional issues is also a very important step to halt 
the Kurdish corridor. At this point, the Astana Talks is an important attempt for the purpose 
of isolating the US from the regional issues. In addition to Astana Talks, although there is no 
appropriate ground for forming a strategic alliance between Turkey and Russia against the 
PKK, Turkey’s cooperation with Russia may strengthen Ankara’s hand in terms of halting the 
Kurdish corridor.       
The Aegean Sea dispute is mostly considered a set of territorial disagreements between 
Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty. However, the dispute combined with Greece’s 
accession to the EC in 1981 and recent developments related to the refugee crisis in the 
Aegean Sea has turned to a potential confrontation area between Turkey and the West. AKP 
since the 2000s pursued soft policies regarding Aegean Sea disputes. An announcement made 
in 1995 against Greece’s nautical mile claims was not practiced by the AKP in the context of 
the EU accession process. According to former Secretary of National Defence Ministry Umit 
Yalim, Greece has gradually settled 17 islands and 1 islet, since 2004. Beside this, Ankara’s 
recent calls on the NATO to halt its patrol in the Aegean Sea stemmed from Turkey’s doubts 
about NATO’s intentions in the Aegean Sea. Turkey perceives the existence of NATO 
vessels as a part of rising militarisation efforts on islands that are to be demilitarised.  
Furthermore, western countries’ perception of Gulen Organisation is sharply different from 
Turkey. Gulen Organisation is predominantly considered pro-American as its leader and 
other important members settle in the US. Especially regarding the coup d’état attempt, the 
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American involvement is subject to debate due to the strong historical links between the 
Gulen Organisation and the US. Beside the US, European countries also have positive 
attitudes towards the Gulen Organisation. A certain number of Gulenist officers managed to 
flee Turkey to European countries. The requests for extradition of alleged Gulenist members 
and Gulen have been rejected so far by Western governments. In contrast to the US and 
Europe, Russia and China have similar attitudes with Turkey. Russia began closing down 
Gulen-linked schools as of the beginning of the 2000s. In addition, the leader of Gulen-linked 
WUC is considered as a terrorist organisation by China.  
To sum up, although existent literature on the Turkish foreign policy direction covers the 
ideological aspects of it comprehensively, strategic aspects of it have been overlooked. We 
observed that the security concerns of Turkey have played a major role on Turkey’s foreign 
policy evolution and Turkey’s current deviation from the West is based on these security 
concerns. Turkey’s creation of alliances is inconsistent with the existent external threats. 
Therefore, Turkish strategic orientation has turned into an obligation for decision makers 
regarding external threats for the purpose of balancing these threats. Then, an alliance 
formation, balancing these external threats, will lay down the basis for a new route of Turkish 
foreign policy. At this point, hopefully this thesis provides insights and raises questions for 
future studies. 
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Appendix 
Glossary of Terms and Persons: 
Atlantic System: It is a term referring an international political concert tying other nations 
economically, militarily etc. to Western European countries or the US. 
CHP (Republican People's Party):  It is a Turkish political party founded by Ataturk. It was 
the ruling party in Turkey till 1950.  
DP (Democratic Party):   It was a Turkish political party was in power between 1950 and 
1961 in Turkey. 
Misak-ı Milli(The National Pact): It refers to a set of decisions that was formed by Ataturk 
in order to define purposes of Turkish Independent War. It was also adopted in the last 
session of the Ottoman parliament in 1920 for the purpose of anouncing its support to 
Turkish Independence War. 
Neo-Ottomanism: It is an identity-based foreign policy thinking in Turkey that is based on a 
set of imaginations claiming that Turkey would be a hegemon power in the former Ottoman 
space by embracing historical and cultural ties inherited from the Ottoman Empire. 
The West: It is a term holding two meanings for this thesis, first is a group of geopolitical 
actors holding common overseas interests to a certain extent and second is a political concert 
established by these geopolitical actors which are located in Western Europe and America. 
Turgut Ozal: He was a Turkish politician serving both as a prime-minister (1983-1989) and 
as a president (1989-1993) in Turkey. 
 
 
 
